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THE PREFERRED PREFERENCES IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW* 
EMILY GOLD WALDMAN** 
In theory, customer preferences cannot justify discriminatory 
treatment by employers. The reality is more complicated. Built 
into the structure of federal employment discrimination law are 
several openings for customer preferences to provide employer 
defenses to what would otherwise likely be actionable 
discrimination. 
This Article explores when and which customer preferences can 
enter those openings. It focuses on what I deem the “preferred 
preferences”: the customer preferences that have formed the basis 
of successful employer defenses to discrimination claims. This 
Article identifies and evaluates six such preferences: (1) aesthetic 
appeal; (2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex; 
(3) psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same 
sex; (4) an English-only environment; (5) avoidance of 
proselytization or judgment; and (6) convenience. This Article 
also analyzes a potential seventh preferred preference—
diversity—that courts have yet to consider. 
The Article shows that each individual preferred preference is not 
just a one-off exception to the supposed irrelevance of customer 
preferences but part of a collective body of doctrine that operates 
according to its own principles. Although courts are not explicit 
about this, these preferences intuitively strike courts as 
reasonable and natural, both because they do not seem 
invidiously discriminatory and because they align with ingrained 
social conventions and norms. As a result, courts (1) consider 
them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or (2) view 
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compliance with them as imposing only a minor burden on 
employees. The more that these two factors are satisfied, the 
more preference deference we see. 
But courts are not striking the right balance in their preference 
deference. This largely stems from the tension between the claim 
that customer preferences are irrelevant in antidiscrimination law 
and the reality that they sometimes do count. To reconcile this 
dissonance, courts elevate the preferred preferences into virtual 
needs or minimize how much they burden employees. In the 
process, biases and inconsistencies sneak in. This Article 
illuminates how this occurs and then argues that a reordering of 
the current preference hierarchy is in order. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A basic tenet of employment discrimination law is that customer 
preferences generally cannot justify discriminatory treatment by 
employers.1 As one court recently put it, “[c]ourts have consistently 
held that, in the employment law context, client or consumer 
preference cannot cleanse an employer’s actions—even when the 
employer claims to have acted free of bias.”2 Otherwise, the 
antidiscrimination mandates would lack any teeth. 
Built into the structure of federal employment discrimination 
law, however, are several openings for customer preferences to 
provide employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be 
actionable discrimination. These include: 
• The bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) 
defense to intentional discrimination based on sex, 
religion, national origin, and age;3 
• The “business necessity” defense to disparate impact 
claims;4 and 
 
 1. Turner v. Parker Sec. & Investigative Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-113(WLS), 2014 
WL 5819929, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2014) (“‘Customer preference’ is not a legitimate 
defense under Title VII.” (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 
902, 905 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990); and then citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 
385, 388–89 (5th 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971))); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (noting that “the federal courts have agreed that it is 
impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of 
stereotyped characterizations of the sexes”); Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 
F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater 
to the perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for 
treating employees differently based on race.” (internal citations omitted)); Rucker v. 
Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Customer preference has 
repeatedly been rejected as a justification for discrimination against women.” (citing 
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
 2. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., Civil No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md. 
Oct. 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted); see also Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913; Rucker, 669 
F.2d at 1181; cf. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333–34 (agreeing with the view that the BFOQ 
defense “provides only the narrowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality 
of employment opportunities”). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. §	623(f)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).  
 4. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
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• The requirement that employers accommodate the 
religious practices and disabilities of their employees 
only when the requested accommodations are 
“reasonable” and do not impose an “undue hardship.”5 
This Article explores when and which customer preferences can 
successfully enter these openings. For example, in what circumstances 
can a customer preference for same-sex service create a BFOQ for a 
job? If an employer’s facially neutral appearance policy responds to a 
strong customer preference, is that enough to make it “consistent with 
business necessity,”6 notwithstanding its disparate impact as to a 
protected characteristic like race? And if an accommodation for a 
religious employee will offend customers, does that count as imposing 
an undue hardship, thereby removing the employer’s obligation to 
provide it? 
Although each customer preference opening has received much 
scholarly attention,7 they are less often considered together. This 
 
 5. For discrimination based on religion, this requirement stems from the 
combination of Title VII’s definition of “religion” including “all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business,” id. §	2000e(j), and its provision that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s .	.	. religion,” id. 
§	2000e-2(a). For discrimination based on disability, this requirement stems from the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. See id. §	12112(b)(5)(A). 
 6. Id. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 7. On the BFOQ opening, see generally Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title 
VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977); Kimberly 
A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004); Rachel L. Cantor, Comment, Consumer 
Preferences for Sex and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating 
BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 493 (1999). On the job-related and business 
necessity opening, see generally Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1996); Andrew C. 
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of 
Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996). On the reasonable 
accommodation/undue hardship opening, see generally Pamela S. Karlan & George 
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1 
(1996); James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering 
Reasonable Accommodation, 6 J. CONST. L. 525 (2004); Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The 
Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the Different Applications of the 
Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. L.J. 745 (1998). 
For a recent article discussing the BFOQ and business necessity openings, see generally 
Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
1169 (2017). Relatedly, for discussions concerning employers’ reliance on unfavorable 
customer feedback, see Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring 
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Article provides that collective examination. It offers a descriptive 
and normative analysis of how customer preferences fit into 
employment discrimination law, focusing on what I deem the 
“preferred preferences.” These are the customer preferences that, 
notwithstanding the general presumption to the contrary, have 
successfully provided the basis of employer defenses to discrimination 
claims. This Article identifies six such preferred preferences: (1) 
aesthetic appeal; (2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite 
sex; (3) psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same 
sex; (4) an English-only environment; (5) avoidance of proselytization 
or judgment; and (6) convenience. I also discuss a possible seventh 
preferred preference—diversity—which is being increasingly 
expressed by customers, but about which there is scant case law so 
far. As this Article will show, even though these preferences seem 
widely disparate, they are actually linked by some common threads 
that lead to their “preferred” status. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of the Article 
canvasses employment discrimination law to describe the four key 
openings where customer preferences can be taken into account. This 
list includes the three explicit statutory defenses within which 
customer preferences can be considered, plus a more subtle way—the 
judicially created equal burdens doctrine—that such preferences can 
influence courts’ assessments of whether unlawful discrimination has 
occurred in the first place. For each opening, the Article discusses 
which specific preferences have successfully taken hold. 
Part II then cuts across these different domains to provide an 
overarching taxonomy of the preferred preferences themselves. 
Although some of these preferences (like an English-only 
environment and the desire to avoid proselytization) only show up in 
a single opening, others (such as aesthetic appeal and convenience) 
appear in multiple openings. This Part evaluates the relative success 
of the preferred preferences, ranking them each as strongly, 
moderately, or weakly preferred. The strongly preferred preferences 
are those to which courts frequently defer; the moderately preferred 
preferences are those to which courts sometimes defer; and the 
weakly preferred preferences are those to which courts occasionally 
defer. 
 
Biased Customer Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2169–73 
(2018); Lu-in Wang, When the Customer is King: Employment Discrimination as Customer 
Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 270–76 (2016). 
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Moreover, this Part explores what is special about this collection 
of preferences—i.e., when and why they garner more deference. It 
argues that although courts are not explicit about this, these 
preferences intuitively strike courts as reasonable and natural, both 
because they do not seem invidiously discriminatory and because they 
align with ingrained social conventions and norms. As a result, courts 
(1) consider them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or (2) view 
compliance with them as imposing only a minor burden on 
employees. The more that these two factors are satisfied, the more 
preference deference we see. 
Finally, Part III argues that courts are not striking the right 
balance in their preference deference. This largely stems from the 
tension between the claim that customer preferences are irrelevant in 
antidiscrimination law and the reality that they sometimes do count. 
In order to reconcile this dissonance, courts elevate the preferred 
preferences into virtual needs or minimize how much they burden 
employees. In the process, biases and inconsistencies sneak in. Courts 
should begin by acknowledging that all of these preferences are 
indeed preferences rather than virtual necessities. Moreover, courts 
should heighten their awareness of how policies responding to these 
preferences can impose differential burdens—particularly with 
respect to the protected characteristics of sex, race, national origin, 
and religion—on employees. 
That does not mean, however, that all customer preferences 
should be held invalid in the context of antidiscrimination claims. On 
the contrary, I argue that it is still sometimes appropriate to take such 
preferences into account when considering whether actionable 
discrimination has occurred. But we need clearer standards for when 
to do so. Although the particular formulation will vary depending on 
the specific opening and preference, this Article proposes two 
important guideposts in analyzing these issues: (1) a context-specific 
look at whether the preference relates to the employee’s actual 
performance of the specific job and (2) a broad look at the extent to 
which the preference limits equal employment opportunity in the 
workplace. Applying these principles, I suggest a reordering of the 
current preference hierarchy is in order. In particular, the aesthetic 
appeal and English-speaking environment preferences receive too 
much deference, while the same-sex psychological comfort preference 
receives too little deference. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018) 
2018] PREFERRED PREFERENCES 97 
I.  THE CUSTOMER PREFERENCE OPENINGS: AN OVERVIEW 
Federal employment antidiscrimination law includes three major 
statutes: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”),8 which 
addresses discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”);9 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).10 
Underlying these laws are three basic models of employment 
discrimination: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation.11 Within each of these laws, and 
within each of these models, are openings for customer preferences to 
enter the analysis. Specifically, as discussed below, there are two 
openings in the disparate treatment model (the BFOQ defense and 
the equal burdens doctrine),12 one opening in the disparate impact 
model (the business necessity defense),13 and one opening in the 
failure-to-accommodate model (the undue hardship defense).14 This 
Article primarily focuses on Title VII, under which most of the 
customer preference cases arise. 
A. The Disparate Treatment Openings: The BFOQ Defense and the 
Equal Burdens Doctrine 
The first model of discrimination is known as disparate 
treatment—i.e., treating employees differently on the basis of a 
protected characteristic. The disparate treatment model is a central 
part of all three federal antidiscrimination statutes. Title VII explicitly 
prohibits such differential treatment when it is based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.15 The ADEA prohibits differential 
treatment based on age, provided that the employee in question is at 
least forty.16 Finally, the ADA prohibits differential treatment toward 
a “qualified individual on the basis of disability.”17 
Within the disparate treatment model, there are two key 
openings through which customer preference can enter. First, Title 
 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§	2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). 
 9. 29 U.S.C. §§	621–634 (2012). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–12213 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., William L. Corbett, Proving and Defending Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 217, 218 (1986); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex 
Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 900 (2014). 
 12. See infra Section I.A. 
 13. See infra Section I.B. 
 14. See infra Section I.C. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 16. 29 U.S.C. §§	623(a), 631(a) (2012). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. §	12112(a) (2012). 
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VII and the ADEA both include an explicit BFOQ defense to 
disparate treatment. Title VII states that disparate treatment on the 
basis of religion, sex, or national origin is permissible “in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.”18 The ADEA 
includes a parallel BFOQ for age discrimination.19 Thus, if a customer 
preference for employees of a certain religion, sex, national origin, or 
age rises to the level of a BFOQ, that preference can provide the 
basis for a successful employer defense. 
Second, sometimes customer preferences play a role in 
determining whether something counts as disparate treatment at all. 
Here, technically speaking, the preferences do not serve as a defense 
but rather influence whether the court thinks actionable 
discrimination has occurred in the first place. The most explicit 
example of this phenomenon is the judicially created equal burdens 
doctrine for Title VII challenges to sex-differentiated appearance 
policies.20 
Both of these openings are discussed in detail below. 
1.  The BFOQ Opening 
The BFOQ defense is probably the clearest customer preference 
opening within employment discrimination law. In fact, although the 
legislative history on the BFOQ is sparse, it suggests that Congress 
indeed had customer preferences in mind when it enacted the BFOQ 
defense. Even before sex was added as a protected characteristic 
under Title VII, the BFOQ defense had already been included for 
religious and national origin discrimination, but not discrimination 
based on race or color.21 Once Title VII’s list of protected 
characteristics was expanded to include sex during the House’s final 
stage of deliberations, Representative Charles Goodell proposed a 
parallel expansion of the BFOQ defense to include sex.22 He framed 
his argument explicitly in terms of customer preferences, stating: 
“There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona fide 
 
 18. Id. §	2000e-2(e)(1). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. §	623(f)(1) (2012). 
 20. See infra Section I.A.2. 
 21. See Sirota, supra note 7, at 1027–31 (providing a detailed history of the events 
leading up to the BFOQ’s inclusion in Title VII). 
 22. Id. at 1028; see also 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964). 
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occupational qualification. For instance, I think of the elderly woman 
who wants a female nurse.”23 
Similarly, in the Senate, an interpretive memorandum described 
the BFOQ defense as authorizing “legitimate discrimination,”24 such 
as “the preference of a business which seeks the patronage of .	.	. 
particular religious groups for a salesman of that religion.”25 The clear 
implication was that customers of a particular religious group would 
prefer a salesperson of the same religion and that the employer 
should be free to satisfy that “legitimate” preference. 
But courts have not interpreted the BFOQ opening for customer 
preferences to be as big as the legislative history might suggest. On 
the contrary, courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that most 
customer preferences for employees of a certain age, religion, 
national origin, or sex can give rise to valid BFOQs. This issue has 
arisen most frequently with sex discrimination claims, where courts 
have consistently rejected sex-based preferences that stem from 
stereotypical or chauvinistic conceptions of women. 
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,26 for example, Pan 
American (“Pan Am”) argued that female sex was a BFOQ for being 
a flight attendant,27 and the trial court found that “passengers 
overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female stewardesses.”28 
The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that “it would be 
totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices 
of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was 
valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the [Civil 
Rights Act of 1964] was meant to overcome.”29 The court thus 
concluded that a successful BFOQ defense requires a showing that 
“the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not 
hiring members of one sex exclusively.”30 Because the essence of Pan 
Am’s business was “to transport passengers safely from one point to 
another,” sex could not be considered a BFOQ.31 
A subsequent district court decision rejected Southwest Airlines’ 
claim that, because it had branded itself as the “love” airline, the 
essence of its business operation would be undermined by hiring men 
 
 23. 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964) (statement of Rep. Goodell). 
 24. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). 
 25. Id. 
 26. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 27. See id. at 386. 
 28. Id. at 387. 
 29. Id. at 389. 
 30. Id. at 388. 
 31. See id. at 388–89. 
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for ticket sales and flight attendant positions.32 “[S]ex does not 
become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit 
female sexuality as a marketing tool,”33 the court explained, 
contrasting Southwest Airlines’ flight attendant positions to “jobs 
where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service 
provided, e. g. a social escort or topless dancer .	.	. [where] the 
employee’s sex and the service provided are inseparable.”34 
Just as courts have held that chauvinistic customer preferences 
cannot give rise to BFOQs that favor women, they have also held that 
such preferences cannot establish BFOQs that exclude women. In 
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,35 for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the argument that being male was a BFOQ for a high-level corporate 
position because of the employer’s concern that Latin American 
clients would react negatively to a female vice president.36 The court 
stated that “stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do not 
qualify gender as a BFOQ.”37 Similarly, a Virginia district court 
explained that a sports club could not cater to customer preferences 
for a “male macho image” by only hiring men for its athletic director 
position.38 
There are two customer preferences, however, that have 
repeatedly entered the BFOQ opening to create a sex-based BFOQ.39 
 
 32. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 33. Id. at 303. 
 34. Id. at 301. Indeed, as Yuracko explains, courts generally distinguish between a 
business that “is selling sex only” and a business that “is selling something else plus sex.” 
Yuracko, supra note 7, at 212–13. These situations fall along a “sexual-titillation 
continuum”: the more that the job involves providing sexual gratification itself, such as 
being a prostitute, lap dancer, or nude centerfold model, the more likely sex—either male 
or female, as applicable—is held to be a BFOQ. Id. at 157. By contrast, when the 
employer sells something other than sex and simply uses sex appeal for marketing, courts 
generally reject the BFOQ argument. Id. at 158. Yuracko has also noted that the Hooters 
restaurant chain seems to be maintaining its policy of only hiring women as food servers 
by settling sex discrimination lawsuits rather than going to court. KIMBERLY A. 
YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 127 (2016). That said, sometimes 
particular sex appeal preferences, such as for female employees to present themselves in 
traditionally feminine ways as to their hair, makeup, and dress, end up taking hold through 
the equal burdens doctrine that is discussed below. See infra Section I.A.2. 
 35. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 36. See id. at 1274, 1276. 
 37. Id. at 1276 (citing City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707 (1978); and then citing Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980)). 
 38. Morris v. Bianchini, Civ. A. No. 86-0742-A, 1987 WL 11822, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
24, 1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 467 (4th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table decision). 
 39. In saying that these preferences can successfully provide the basis for a sex 
BFOQ, I mean that, at a minimum, courts allow these preferences to be presented to 
juries as part of a BFOQ defense. In numerous cases discussed herein, courts went even 
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These preferences are sometimes referred to under the umbrella term 
of “privacy,” but they can be usefully divided into two categories: (1) 
a preference for same-sex service that stems from customers’ interest 
in physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex and (2) a 
preference for same-sex service that stems from customers’ sense of 
psychological comfort/affinity with employees of the same sex. These 
two interests are closely related—and can often be implicated in the 
same job—but they are distinct. 
a. Physical Privacy from the Opposite Sex 
Numerous courts have held that preferences related to physical 
privacy—specifically customers’ desires not to have their nude bodies 
seen and/or touched by the opposite sex—can justify a sex-based 
BFOQ.40 Courts are most deferential when the job involves not just 
seeing customers’ naked bodies but actually touching them. As one 
court explained when holding that female sex was a BFOQ for 
nursing positions that involved intimate care to elderly women,41 the 
job responsibilities involved “intimate personal care including 
dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter 
care. Each of these functions involves a personal touching as to which 
each guest is privileged by law to discriminate on any basis.”42 
 
further, granting summary judgment to the employer on grounds that it had indisputably 
made out the BFOQ defense. By contrast, the disfavored preferences get rejected at 
summary judgment.  
 40. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 
1984); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okla. 
Feb. 2, 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981), 
vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. 
Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 41. Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1354. 
 42. Id. at 1352–53. Note that this reasoning could theoretically be extended to race as 
well. Title VII does not have a race-based BFOQ, however, and at least one court has held 
that it would violate Title VII for a hospital or other employer to comply with a patient 
request for only white nurses. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 
(7th Cir. 2010). Kimani Paul-Emile has nonetheless noted that, in practice, requests for 
physicians of a particular race are sometimes made and accommodated, “most often .	.	. 
when made by racial minority patients.” Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences 
and the Medical Culture of Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 464, 500 (2012). Paul-
Emile further argues in support of such accommodations, pointing to empirical data 
indicating “that permitting hospitals to accede to their patients’ racial preferences may not 
only alleviate race-based health disparities but also constitute a life-saving measure for 
many racial-minority patients.” Id. at 467. As Paul-Emile states, no courts have so ruled—
which is why this preference is not included among the Article’s list of currently preferred 
preferences. See id. at 483. 
That said, a major new working paper from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research provides strong empirical evidence for the claim that African American male 
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Relatedly, courts are sympathetic to the emotional discomfort 
customers/patients may experience if their sense of physical privacy is 
infringed upon. For example, in the labor nurse context, one district 
court wrote: 
[I]t is important that the birth experience not only be positive 
but also without stress. .	.	. [D]ue to the sensitive and intimate 
duties performed by staff nurses in this area, there is a factual 
basis for determining that the employment of male nurses in the 
labor and delivery area would cause medically undesired 
tension.43 
More recently, a Tennessee district court relied on the BFOQ defense 
to uphold the Transportation Security Administration’s (“TSA”) 
policy of requiring at least 33% of its screeners to be women so that 
there would always be a same-sex screener to conduct pat-down 
searches at the airport.44 Even the Supreme Court has nodded to the 
validity of the physical privacy BFOQ, although it has not explicitly 
addressed the issue.45 
In the few physical privacy cases that have actually gone to trial, 
as opposed to being decided in the employer’s favor on summary 
judgment, it was typically because there was a factual question about 
whether there were other ways for the employer to accommodate the 
physical privacy preference. But the basic validity of the preference 
itself is accepted as a given. In Little Forest Medical Center of Akron 
 
patients could have better medical outcomes when seen by African American male 
physicians, as opposed to when they are seen by male physicians of other ethnicities. See 
Marcella Alsan, Owen Garrick & Grant C. Graziani, Does Diversity Matter for Health? 
Experimental Evidence from Oakland 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 24787, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24787 [https://perma.cc/Q9HT-C54U]. The 
researchers calculated that “black doctors would reduce mortality from cardiovascular 
disease by 16 deaths per 100,000 per year, accounting for 19% of the black-white gap in 
cardiovascular mortality.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). They did not attribute this result to 
discrimination but to better patient-doctor communication, explaining “subjects were 10 
percentage points (29%) more likely to talk with black male doctors about other health 
problems. Black doctors were 11 percentage points (35%) more likely to write notes about 
black patients than non-black doctors.” Id. at 4. If and when additional support for these 
results emerge, it is possible that there will be a judicial or legislative response that makes 
room for this preference within employment discrimination law.  
 43. Mercy Health Ctr., 1982 WL 3108, at *5; see also Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1195–96 
(holding that female sex is a BFOQ for being a labor nurse). 
 44. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3-07-0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at *9–10 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
24, 2009). 
 45. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) (stating that 
“[n]othing in our discussion of the ‘essence of the business test’ .	.	. suggests that sex could 
not constitute a BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated” (citing Backus, 510 F. Supp. 
at 1195–96)). 
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v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission,46 for instance, the court held that a 
trial was appropriate because, despite the defendant nursing home’s 
argument that female sex was a BFOQ for nursing aide positions, it 
was possible that the nursing home could instead accommodate its 
residents’ preferences by hiring both males and females for the 
positions and then “assigning male nurse’s aides to male residents and 
non-objecting female residents and female nurse’s aides to female and 
non-objecting male residents.”47 
Interestingly, some of the physical privacy cases implicate a 
supplementary customer preference as well: convenience. For 
example, in upholding the TSA’s policy of requiring at least 33% of 
its screeners to be women, the Wade court indicated that it would not 
be feasible to have a more skewed ratio because that would result in 
unacceptable wait times.48 Indeed, courts have indicated that 
convenience is also a legitimate preference that should enter the 
analysis—i.e., that employers should have room to accommodate 
customers’ physical privacy preferences in ways that do not overly 
inconvenience customers.49 This means that the convenience 
preference can end up working with the physical privacy preference 
to create a BFOQ because there are situations where the only way to 
simultaneously satisfy both preferences is to hire an employee of a 
particular sex for the position. 
 
 46. 575 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1991). 
 47. Id. at 1171. Similarly, in EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the 
district court held that a jury trial was required as to whether female sex was a BFOQ for 
jobs in an all-female gym that would involve taking prospective members through tours of 
the locker room and taking their measurements. Id. at 1293 & n.2, 1296. The EEOC had 
pointed to alternatives like “allowing females to assist clients who object to being touched 
by males, posting a schedule to inform clients of when male employees would be on duty, 
or letting clients take themselves through the locker room.” Id. at 1297. The court decided 
that more factual development was needed. Id. at 1297–98. 
 48. Wade, 2009 WL 9071049, at *2 (“TSA determined that no less than 33% of 
screeners needed to be women to ensure the availability of same gender-searches without 
compromising security or significantly increasing wait times at checkpoints.” (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted)). 
 49. For example, in ruling that a restroom attendant BFOQ case should go to trial, 
one district court stated that the evidence might demonstrate that it would be infeasible to 
schedule shifts whereby male custodians could enter women’s restrooms. See Hernandez 
v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 217–18 (D. Minn. 1992). The court referred to 
affidavits indicating that, “when the male custodians worked in the [women’s] dormitory, 
the closing of bathrooms led to inconveniences and embarrassing situations that infringed 
on [female students’] privacy,” and implied that such evidence could support the argument 
that female sex was a BFOQ for the custodial position, on grounds that there was no other 
way to simultaneously accommodate both the physical privacy preference and the 
convenience preference. Id. 
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b. Psychological Comfort with the Same Sex 
By contrast, in situations where the customer will not be seen 
naked—and the preference for same-gender care stems from a 
psychological, rather than physical, rationale—courts are much less 
deferential. There are indeed a few cases where courts have held that 
psychological comfort/affinity with the same sex can give rise to a 
BFOQ, hence its inclusion among this Article’s taxonomy of 
preferred preferences. But such rulings are rare. One example is 
Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital,50 in which the defendant-
employer was a residential hospital for emotionally disturbed and 
sexually abused children and adolescents.51 There, the defendants 
argued that the hospital should be able to take sex into account when 
making hiring and scheduling decisions in order to ensure that there 
were enough male and female employees assigned to all shifts.52 The 
Third Circuit agreed that the hospital had established that “the 
therapeutic aspects of the child care specialist job require the 
consideration of gender,” noting that adolescent patients were more 
comfortable discussing their sexuality concerns with staff members of 
the same sex and that “subtle interactions such as ‘role modeling’” 
were part of the job.53 
More commonly, however, courts reject such arguments.54 In 
EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp.,55 for example, the district court rejected a 
weight loss center’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for being 
 
 50. 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 51. Id. at 130, 132. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 133–34; cf. Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(accepting that the role-modeling/mentoring aspects of the counselor position for a 
juvenile detention facility pointed toward “the usefulness of mentors of the same sex” but 
rejecting the defendant’s contention that this was necessary even during the night shift 
because the juveniles were largely sleeping during that period). While physical privacy 
concerns were also in the mix since part of the job involved accompanying young patients 
to the bathroom and bathing them, the Healey court nonetheless focused on the 
psychological concerns. See Healey, 78 F.3d at 133–34. 
 54. See Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056, 1063–64, 1068–69 (D. 
Ariz. 1999) (rejecting Marriott’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for massage 
therapists and explaining that, notwithstanding Marriott’s evidence that most of its 
customers—particularly women who had suffered some form of sexual abuse—preferred 
female masseuses, “the legitimate job duties of a massage therapist .	.	. do not include 
viewing or touching female clients’ breasts or either male or female clients’ genitalia”); 
Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 701, 704–05 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (rejecting defense by 
workshop for mentally ill young adult males that male sex was a BFOQ to replace the 
departing male child care worker when the employer argued that “[i]t was necessary to 
have a male in the workshop at all times to provide counseling in advance to male patients 
on topics of sexuality and sexual development”).  
 55. 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996). 
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a weight loss counselor.56 The court acknowledged that the customer 
base was 95% women and that some women had objected to having 
their measurements taken by a man and indicated that they “would 
not feel comfortable discussing emotional and physiological issues 
associated with weight loss with a man.”57 But the court dismissed this 
as a mere preference and fell back on the so-called rule that 
“preferences by customers have little, if any, legitimate role in making 
determinations of the legitimacy of discrimination.”58 
2.  The Equal Burdens Opening 
The other customer preference opening within the disparate 
treatment framework is more subtle. It lies not in any statutory 
language, but in courts’ own assessment of what amounts to disparate 
treatment in the first place. Specifically, courts have held that sex-
differentiated appearance requirements—which typically align with 
customers’ expressed or assumed aesthetic preferences—do not count 
as disparate treatment under Title VII unless they are unequally 
burdensome on male and female employees.59 In other words, as long 
as the differentiated appearance requirements impose “equal 
burdens,” they do not constitute disparate treatment at all.60 
This equal burdens doctrine creates an opening for customers’ 
aesthetic preferences in two ways. First, it explicitly permits such 
preferences to give rise to sex-differentiated appearance 
requirements—notwithstanding Title VII’s prohibition of disparate 
terms and conditions of employment based on sex—as long as the 
requirements are equally burdensome. Second, and even more 
significantly, courts have applied the equal burdens test very loosely, 
allowing employers to defer to customer preferences that are in 
reality more burdensome on females than males.61 
 
 56. Id. at 305. 
 57. Id. at 302–03. 
 58. Id. at 305 (citing Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 59. See, e.g., Viscecchia v. Alrose Allegria LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250–52 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (summarizing the case law in this area). 
 60. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An appearance 
standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not 
disparate treatment.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390–92 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (“An employer is simply not required to account for personal preferences with 
respect to dress and grooming standards.”). For a wide-ranging analysis of other judicially 
created doctrines that favor employers in discrimination lawsuits, see generally SANDRA 
F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE 
DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017). 
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A blatant example of this latter phenomenon is Craft v. 
Metromedia, Inc.,62 a case involving a television reporter named 
Christine Craft.63 Almost immediately after hiring Craft as a 
coanchor, her television station employer became concerned about 
her appearance (namely, her clothing and makeup).64 Craft’s 
superiors gave her a book on wardrobe and makeup, and even 
brought in a wardrobe consultant for advice.65 After several focus 
groups indicated that viewer response to Craft’s appearance was 
“overwhelmingly negative,” the oversight intensified and Craft was 
put on a “clothing calendar.”66 The television station then conducted 
a follow-up telephone survey asking people to rank Craft specifically 
on her looks and image in comparison with other female coanchors.67 
After negative results came in, she was reassigned from coanchor to 
reporter.68 
Craft sued under Title VII, alleging that the appearance 
standards were based on stereotypes and impermissible customer 
preferences and that they were applied to female employees “more 
constantly and vigorously than they were applied to men.”69 At the 
bench trial, the very consultant who had been brought in to dress 
Craft explicitly testified that “viewers—particularly other women—
criticize women more severely than men for their appearance on 
camera and that women’s dress is more complex and demanding 
because ‘society has made it that way.’”70 Even so, Craft lost at the 
trial level and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,71 deferring to the district 
court’s conclusion that the station was “equally concerned with the 
appearance of its male and female on-air personnel”72 and “enforced 
its appearance standards equally as to males and females in response 
to individual problems.”73 
 
 62. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 63. Id. at 1207. 
 64. Id. at 1208. Ironically, Craft had specifically told the employer throughout the 
interview process that she was not interested in the position if a “‘makeover’ of her 
appearance” would be expected. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1208–09. 
 66. Id. at 1209 (quoting Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 873 (W.D. Mo. 
1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1209–10. 
 70. Id. at 1214.  
 71. Id. at 1207–08. 
 72. Id. at 1217. 
 73. Id. at 1213. 
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Craft dates back to 1985, but its themes resonate in a more recent 
case, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,74 decided in 2006. There, 
plaintiff Darlene Jespersen, who worked as a bartender, brought a 
Title VII claim challenging new sex-based appearance standards that 
had been imposed by her employer, Harrah’s.75 Under those rules, 
known as the “‘Personal Best’ program,” both male and female 
employees were supposed to be “well groomed, appealing to the eye, 
[and] firm and body toned.”76 Additionally, men’s hair could not 
extend below their shirt collar, while women were required to wear 
their hair teased, curled, or styled, and were also required to wear 
face powder, blush, mascara, and lip color.77 Jespersen, who was 
uncomfortable wearing makeup, quit and then sued.78 The Ninth 
Circuit ruled against her, invoking the equal burdens doctrine and 
concluding that Jespersen had not done enough to prove that it was 
more time consuming and expensive for women to comply with the 
daily makeup requirement than for men to comply with keeping their 
hair relatively short.79 
Thus, in both Craft and Jespersen, customer preferences for 
aesthetic appeal—namely, for women to have a certain feminine 
look—drove the employer requirements. There was clear evidence of 
this: the television station in Craft had relied on viewer focus groups 
and surveys,80 and Harrah’s had specifically stated that its “Personal 
Best” policy stemmed from customer preferences, explaining when 
the policy was implemented that its “customers have said that when 
they go to a casino, they’re looking for a night out and they want 
people to be well-groomed.”81 Moreover, as Judge Kozinski pointed 
out in his dissent, there is no “rational doubt” that requiring women 
to apply full facial makeup each day is more burdensome than 
requiring men to keep their hair short.82 Yet each court declined to 
 
 74. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 75. Id. at 1105. 
 76. Id. at 1107. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1108. 
 79. Id. at 1108–11. The majority also disagreed that Harrah’s had engaged in 
impermissible sex stereotyping under Title VII, stating that the policy “requires all of the 
bartenders to wear exactly the same uniforms” and “is for the most part unisex.” Id. at 
1111–12. 
 80. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 81. Scott Mayerowitz, Harrah’s Draws Criticism; Employee Appearance Standards Go 
“Overboard,” PROVIDENCE J., reprinted in HOTEL ONLINE (July 13, 2004), 
https://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2004_3rd/Jul04_HarrahsPolicies.html [https://perma.cc/
BC46-EGU5]. 
 82. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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grapple fully with these preferences’ greater burdens on women. 
Instead, the courts insisted that the burdens seemed equal enough 
and ruled for the employer. As further discussed in Part II, because 
these customer preferences resonated with the judges’ intuitive sense 
of natural, appropriate gender-based appearance conventions, the 
courts dismissed the differential burdens that they actually imposed as 
de minimis. 
Although the equal burdens doctrine is an important customer 
preference opening, it is not unlimited. Courts have recognized that 
sex-differentiated appearance policies that are facially more 
burdensome on women than men amount to disparate treatment. For 
example, in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,83 the Ninth Circuit struck 
down a policy whereby female employees had to meet the 
requirements of a medium body frame standard, while male 
employees only had to satisfy a large body frame standard.84 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recently held that sex-differentiated 
appearance codes may be unacceptably burdensome on transgender 
employees who are forced to follow the code for their assigned sex 
rather than the one for their gender identity.85 This holding tracks 
Kimberly Yuracko’s observation that “[t]ranssexuals are beginning to 
win because they are able to convince courts that, for them, sex-based 
grooming demands are painful. In contrast, non-transsexual gender 
benders [like Craft and Jespersen] lose precisely because courts view 
the burdensomeness for them of such conformity demands as 
 
 83. 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 84. Id. at 855. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit struck down a Continental Airlines policy 
that required “an exclusively female category of flight attendants, and no other 
employees,” to comply with a weight restriction. Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 
602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 85. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 576–77, 580 
(6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 20, 2018). However, the court 
did not strike down the code itself but just indicated that the transitioning employee 
should be able to follow the code that comported with her gender identity. Id. at 573 (“We 
are not considering, in this case, whether the Funeral Home violated Title VII by requiring 
men to wear pant suits and women to wear skirt suits. Our question instead is whether the 
Funeral Home could legally terminate Stephens, notwithstanding that she fully intended 
to comply with the company’s sex-specific dress code, simply because she refused to 
conform to the Funeral Home’s notion of her sex.”). Thus, the court apparently viewed 
the situation less as an unequal burdens case than as one about discrimination based on 
transgender/transitioning status and gender stereotypes. Cf. Creed v. Family Express 
Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (rejecting a 
transgender employee’s claim that it was sex discrimination not to allow her to start 
following the dress code for female employees on grounds that the employer’s 
“requirement that male and female employees adhere to grooming standards matching 
their [assigned] gender doesn’t discriminate on the basis of sex”). 
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trivial.”86 Indeed, once the burden of a gender-based-appearance 
code is less facially apparent and measurable, customers’ stereotypical 
preferences about employees’ appearance have the opportunity to 
sneak back into the equal burdens opening, without being recognized 
as a form of discrimination at all. 
B. The Disparate Impact Opening: The Business Necessity Defense 
Like disparate treatment, the second model of discrimination, 
disparate impact, is addressed by all three federal antidiscrimination 
statutes.87 Unlike disparate treatment liability, disparate impact 
liability covers situations where an employer has a facially neutral 
practice that nonetheless has a disparate impact as to a statutorily 
protected characteristic.88 For example, a requirement that all 
employees be at least six feet tall would have a disparate impact as to 
sex, even though it would not constitute facially disparate treatment. 
Under Title VII, if a plaintiff-employee can identify such a practice 
and statistically prove its disparate impact, then the defendant-
employer must defend itself by showing that the practice is “job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity” and that an alternative practice would not suffice instead.89 
The ADEA also allows disparate impact claims, although the 
employer can defend against them simply by showing that the 
differentiation is “based on reasonable factors other than age.”90 
Finally, the ADA provides its own version of disparate impact 
liability, stating that it is impermissible to use 
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection 
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with 
a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the 
standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered 
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question 
and is consistent with business necessity.91 
Thus, in the disparate impact context, there is one key opening 
through which customer preferences can potentially enter: the “job 
 
 86. YURACKO, supra note 34, at 98. 
 87. See 29 U.S.C. §	623(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§	2000e-2(k)(1)(A), 12112(b)(6) 
(2012). 
 88. George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1987). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) to (ii), 2(k)(1)(C) (2012). 
 90. 29 U.S.C. §	623(f)(1) (2012). 
 91. §	12112(b)(6). 
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related .	.	. and consistent with business necessity” defense92 (or, in the 
ADEA, the roughly analogous “reasonable factors other than age” 
defense,93 which is even easier to satisfy). 
This defense, like the BFOQ defense, is now statutory. But the 
defense—along with the very concept of disparate impact liability at 
all—originated with the Supreme Court. In 1971, just a few years after 
Title VII was enacted, the Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co.94 Prior to Title VII’s passage, Duke Power had facially 
discriminated, only allowing African Americans to work in one of its 
five departments.95 Once Title VII was passed, Duke Power adopted a 
facially neutral policy whereby only applicants with high school 
diplomas and passing scores on two aptitude tests could obtain 
positions in the four other, more desirable departments.96 
At the time, Title VII only prohibited disparate treatment. But 
Duke Power’s policy had a clearly disparate impact as to race, and the 
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that such practices could also 
violate Title VII.97 “The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination 
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation,” the Court explained.98 “The touchstone is business 
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude 
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.”99 The Supreme Court later made this business 
necessity defense easier to satisfy, stating in its 1989 Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio100 decision that “the dispositive issue is whether 
a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate 
employment goals of the employer. .	.	.	[T]here is no requirement that 
the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the 
employer’s business for it to pass muster .	.	.	.”101 Wards Cove further 
stated that, for this defense, the burden of persuasion always 
remained with the plaintiff.102 
 
 92. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 93. §	623(f)(1). 
 94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 95. Id. at 426–27. 
 96. Id. at 427–28. 
 97. Id. at 430–31 (“[P]ractices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even 
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo 
of prior discriminatory employment practices.”).  
 98. Id. at 431. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 101. Id. at 659 (internal citations omitted). 
 102. Id. 
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Congress, however, rejected Wards Cove’s softening of the 
standard. It passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title 
VII by, inter alia, codifying the disparate impact form of liability and 
a more stringent business necessity defense.103 Accordingly, Title VII 
now states that once a disparate impact is shown, the employer bears 
the burden of proving that the “challenged practice is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”104 
The accompanying legislative history expressly states that Title VII 
was amended “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job 
related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio.”105 
Neither Title VII’s text nor the above Supreme Court decisions, 
however, clarify whether a strong customer preference is enough to 
establish the defense by making a practice “job related .	.	. and 
consistent with business necessity.”106 And as with the BFOQ defense, 
courts have allowed certain customer preferences into this opening. 
In particular, there are two customer preferences that have been 
fairly successful in forming the bases of successful business necessity 
defenses: aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment. The 
aesthetic appeal preference is implicated in disparate impact 
challenges to appearance policies, while the English-speaking 
environment preference is implicated in disparate impact challenges 
to English-speaking-only workplace rules. 
1.  Aesthetic Appeal 
The cases involving disparate impact challenges to customer 
preference-based appearance policies most often involve policies with 
disparate impacts as to race.107 Of course, there are many appearance 
policies that implicate other protected characteristics, particularly sex 
and religion. But the sex-based appearance policies are usually not 
facially neutral—indeed, their whole point is to have different rules 
for males and females—so they generally trigger disparate treatment 
 
 103. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) to (ii) (2012). 
 104. Id. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 105. 137 CONG. REC. 28,622 (1991) (citations omitted). 
 106. §	2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). For further discussion of the lack of clarity in what an 
employer must show to prove business necessity, see, for example, Lanning v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 181 F.3d 478, 485–90 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Grover, supra note 7, at 391–93. 
 107. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing a no-beard policy challenged for its disparate impact on African American 
men). 
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challenges instead, as seen above in the equal burdens discussion.108 
Meanwhile, facially neutral appearance policies that have a disparate 
impact on religion, such as prohibitions on beards or head coverings, 
are usually challenged under a failure-to-accommodate theory, as 
discussed below.109 For a facially neutral appearance policy that 
disproportionately affects a particular race, however, the disparate 
impact claim is key. 
Most commonly, the appearance policy being challenged under a 
disparate impact theory involves one very specific aspect of 
appearance: hair, either on the face or the head. Citing customer 
preference, numerous employers have adopted policies prohibiting 
beards or certain types of hairstyles, like braids or dreadlocks.110 The 
disparate impact challenges to no-beard policies (brought exclusively 
by men) have generally succeeded, but the challenges to hairstyle 
policies (usually, though not always, brought by women) have 
generally failed. 
Employers’ no-beard policies can have a disparate impact on 
African American men, a significant portion of whom have a skin 
condition called pseudofolliculitis barbae (“PFB”), which results in 
irritation—to the point of infection and scarring—from shaving.111 For 
many, the only treatment for the condition is to grow a beard.112 
Courts have generally accepted the argument that, because African 
American men suffer from PFB at a much higher rate, no-beard 
policies have a disparate impact as to race.113 Moreover, courts have 
held that customer preferences for clean-shaven employees are not 
enough to satisfy the business necessity defense to disparate impact 
 
 108. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 109. See infra Section I.C. 
 110. See, e.g., Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799 (citing a public opinion survey commissioned by 
the pizza chain to justify its no-beard policy). Some such policies are implemented for 
safety reasons instead of customer preferences, but those are beyond the scope of this 
Article. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1114 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(addressing a no-beard policy for firefighters based on safety standards for the use of 
respirator masks). 
 111. See, e.g., Roopal V. Kundu & Stavonnie Patterson, Dermatologic Conditions in 
Skin of Color: Part II. Disorders Occurring Predominantly in Skin of Color, 87 AM. FAM. 
PHYSICIAN 859, 860 (2013); Gary J. Brauner, Pseudofolliculitis Barbae, SKIN OF COLOR 
SOC’Y, http://skinofcolorsociety.org/dermatology-education/1408-2/ [https://perma.cc/3YTC-
48FB].  
 112. See Kundu & Patterson, supra note 111, at 860. 
 113. See, e.g., Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1155–56 (S.D. Iowa 
1984); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981). But see EEOC v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the EEOC failed to 
prove that Greyhound’s no-beard policy had a disproportionate impact on African 
American employees). 
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claims. For example, in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.,114 
Domino’s Pizza tried to justify its no-beard policy on customer 
preference grounds, citing a public opinion survey indicating “that up 
to twenty percent of those surveyed would react negatively to a 
delivery man wearing a beard.”115 The Eighth Circuit flatly refused to 
allow this purported customer preference into the job-
related/business necessity opening, explaining that “[e]ven if the 
survey results indicated a significant customer apprehension 
regarding beards, which they do not, the results would not constitute 
evidence of a sufficient business justification defense for Domino’s 
strict no-beard policy.”116 Notably, the Eighth Circuit drew from two 
other customer preference openings to support its proposition that 
customer preferences should typically not be taken into account in 
discrimination cases.117 Not only did the court cite the BFOQ cases’ 
language about the usual irrelevance of customer preferences, but it 
also borrowed the “reasonable accommodation” terminology to 
explain why the PFB-suffering employees needed an exemption.118 
African American women, however, have had a much harder 
time challenging employer policies—presumably based on aesthetic 
appeal preferences—that prohibit dreadlocks, braids, or other 
“natural hairstyle[s] .	.	. that [enable] black women to wear their hair 
down and long while retaining the natural structure and texture of 
their hair.”119 It seems obvious that such policies have a disparate 
impact on African American women, because, as Onwuachi-Willig 
explains: 
[A] ban on natural hairstyles for black women leaves black 
women with far fewer choices in hair grooming than white 
women. Essentially, due to the biological nature of black 
women’s hair, such policies currently leave black women with 
one of two choices if they wish to wear their hair long and 
hanging down: either (1) straighten their hair with a chemical 
relaxer or hot comb or (2) wear a weave or wig. Both choices 
 
 114. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 115. Id. at 799. 
 116. Id.; see also Richardson, 591 F. Supp. at 1153 (refusing to admit into evidence a 
customer satisfaction survey regarding concern with employees’ beards because “the 
survey was flawed in both scope and representativeness”). 
 117. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799. 
 118. Id. Indeed, Christine Jolls cited Bradley as an example of the overlapping nature 
of disparate impact liability and failure-to-accommodate liability. See Christine Jolls, 
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 653–55 (2001). 
 119. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis 
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093 (2010). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018) 
114 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
require black women to either change the structure and texture 
of their natural hair or cover it up. .	.	. In this sense, many black 
women are not allowed to wear their natural hair exactly as it 
grows out of their heads as lengthily as white women are 
allowed to wear theirs.120 
Wendy Greene has also noted the financial, emotional, and physical 
burden imposed by such policies.121 
Even so, such challenges have generally been unsuccessful.122 
Often, the disparate impact argument gets largely overlooked, 
sometimes even by plaintiffs.123 In a recent case, EEOC v. Catastrophe 
Management Solutions,124 the EEOC brought suit on behalf of an 
African American job applicant whose job offer was rescinded by the 
employer when she declined to cut off her dreadlocks pursuant to its 
“race-neutral grooming policy.”125 While the EEOC’s proposed 
amended complaint utilized “loose language” that seemed to support 
a disparate impact argument, the EEOC ultimately stated at oral 
argument that it was only pursuing a disparate treatment theory of 
liability.126 The Eleventh Circuit ruled for the employer, stating that 
“Title VII protects persons in covered categories with respect to their 
immutable characteristics, but not their cultural practices.”127 Other 
courts have similarly ruled that hairstyle policies do not trigger 
disparate impact (or treatment) liability.128 
 
 120. Id. at 1089–90. 
 121. D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace 
Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management 
Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1012–14 (2017). 
 122. See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., Civil Action No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 
WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 
229, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
 123. See generally Pitts, 2008 WL 1899306 (bringing a disparate treatment challenge, 
but not a disparate impact challenge, to an employer’s policy of prohibiting dreadlocks, 
cornrows, beads, or shells that were not covered by a hat or visor). 
 124. 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 125. Id. at 1020.  
 126. Id. at 1024. The decision did not explain why the EEOC dropped the disparate 
impact theory. See generally id. (noting that “the EEOC at times conflate[d] the two 
liability theories”).  
 127. Id. at 1030 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 
1975) (en banc); and then citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 128. See, e.g., Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259, 265–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling against male employee who challenged employer’s requirement 
that employees wear a hat over their dreadlocks, or other “‘unbusinesslike’ hairstyles,” on 
the grounds that the rule did not indicate racial animus and that the employee had not 
presented enough statistical evidence to make out a disparate impact claim). 
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The result is that preferences for compliance with “white and 
gendered norm[s]” about women’s hair, as Onwuachi-Willig puts it,129 
have crept into the openings within employment discrimination law. 
As with the preferences for a feminine look in Craft and Jespersen, 
courts have a hard time recognizing that these preferences are 
discriminatory at all. 
2.  English-Only Environment 
The second big customer preference that has repeatedly entered 
the business necessity opening is the preference for an English-only 
speaking environment. In numerous cases citing customer 
preferences, employers have required employees to speak English 
whenever they are near customers, not just when they are actually 
talking to the customer.130 In EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC,131 for 
example, the policy of Sephora cosmetic stores was that sales floor 
staff had to speak English—even to each other—whenever they were 
on the sales floor while clients were present.132 Similarly, in Pacheco v. 
New York Presbyterian Hospital,133 the hospital’s unofficial policy was 
that employees could speak only English when they were in the 
vicinity of patients.134 In both cases, the employers justified their 
English-only policies by stating that when their employees conversed 
in Spanish, their customers/patients felt uncomfortable because they 
felt that they could not approach the employees135 or that the 
employees might be mocking them.136 
Employers in these sorts of cases have generally prevailed. In 
both Sephora and Pacheco, the courts assumed that these policies had 
disparate impacts as to national origin. But they still ultimately ruled 
that these purported customer preferences created a valid job-
related/business necessity defense.137 “[I]f a customer preference is 
sufficiently related to job performance then it qualifies as a ‘business 
necessity,’” the Pacheco court explained, ruling that patients’ 
discomfort with overhearing Spanish conversations that they thought 
 
 129. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 119, at 1083. 
 130. Note, however, that such rules do not go as far as requiring employees to speak 
English in the workplace at all times. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 131. 419 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 132. Id. at 410–11. 
 133. 593 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 134. See id. at 606–07.  
 135. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17. 
 136. Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 614, 621–22. 
 137. Id. at 622–23; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 414, 418. 
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might be about them was enough to qualify.138 “[P]romoting 
politeness to customers is a valid business necessity for requiring sales 
employees to speak English in their presence,” the Sephora court 
similarly stated.139 Both courts agreed that the employers did not even 
need to demonstrate that a particular percentage of customers felt 
this way.140 
The same sort of language in the physical privacy BFOQ cases—
that employers are not responding to a mere preference but 
something more legitimate and weighty—often appears in these 
English-language business necessity cases. As the Sephora court 
stated in describing why salespeople could not speak in Spanish even 
to each other while customers were present, “[w]hen salespeople 
speak in a language customers do not understand, the effects on 
helpfulness, politeness and approachability are real and are not a 
matter of abstract preference.”141 As discussed further in Parts II and 
III, this often-facile distinction between mere preferences and 
something more is one of the keys to unlocking which preferences 
receive the most deference. 
C. The Reasonable Accommodation Opening: The Undue Hardship 
Defense 
The last model of discrimination—the failure to provide 
reasonable accommodation—only appears in the context of religion 
and disability. For religion, this obligation appears in Title VII, which 
prohibits discrimination based on religion,142 and defines religion as 
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate [the] religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”143 For disability, 
this accommodation appears in the ADA, which similarly defines 
discrimination to include “not making reasonable accommodations to 
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”144 
 
 138. Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (quoting Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 416). 
 139. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
 140. Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 621–22; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
 141. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (emphasis added). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 143. Id. §	2000e(j). 
 144. Id. §	12112(b)(5)(A). 
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In both statutes, the key opening through which customer 
preferences can enter is the undue hardship defense, which is closely 
related to the question of whether an accommodation is reasonable in 
the first place. This opening, however, is much wider in the religion 
context than the disability context because of the varying meaning of 
“undue hardship.” While Title VII provides no definition of “undue 
hardship,”145 the Supreme Court interpreted it in 1977 to mean 
anything “more than a de minimis cost.”146 By contrast, the ADA 
defines “undue hardship” as “an action requiring significant difficulty 
or expense.”147 
Title VII’s low threshold for what counts as an undue hardship—
i.e., anything imposing more than a de minimis cost—has created a 
big opening through which customer preferences can enter. Indeed, in 
the religion context, three main customer preferences can provide the 
basis for successful employer defenses: aesthetic appeal, the desire to 
avoid an employee’s proselytization or judgment, and convenience. 
1.  Aesthetic Appeal 
Typically, the aesthetic appeal preference comes up in the 
religious accommodation context when there is a conflict between an 
employer’s general appearance policy (most often relating to head 
coverings, clean-shavenness, or body piercings) and a particular 
employee’s religious practice. The EEOC’s guidance states that, “[i]n 
most instances, employers are required by federal law to make 
exceptions to their usual rules or preferences to permit applicants and 
employees to observe religious dress and grooming practices.”148 
Indeed, there are numerous EEOC consent decrees and judicial 
decisions along those lines.149 
 
 145. See id. §	2000e (mentioning “undue hardship” under “religion” but providing no 
explanation of the term’s meaning).  
 146. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. §	12111(10)(A) (2012). 
 148. Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_
religious_garb_grooming.cfm [https://perma.cc/N4TC-UAWF] (emphasis added). 
 149. See, e.g., Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 474, 484 
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that an employee could go to trial on her claim that the New 
York City Transit Authority, in transferring her from a customer-contact position after 
she refused to remove or cover her khimar, failed to accommodate her practice of Islam); 
Dodd v. SEPTA, Civil Action No. 06-4213, 2008 WL 2902618, at *7–10 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 
2008) (holding that an employee could go to trial on his claim that his employer, in 
requiring him to cut his hair, failed to reasonably accommodate his Rastafarian beliefs); 
EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. C04-1291JLR, 2005 WL 2090677, at *1, 
*5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005) (holding that an employee could go to trial on his claim 
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But most does not mean all. In several cases, parting with the 
EEOC’s interpretation, courts have ruled that employers could make 
out the undue hardship defense to religious accommodation claims by 
relying on appearance policies stemming from expressed or assumed 
customer preferences. 
A good example here is Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,150 a 
First Circuit case involving the “no facial jewelry,” other than 
earrings, provision of Costco’s dress code.151 Costco’s employee 
handbook justified its dress code as follows: “Appearance and 
perception play a key role in member service. .	.	. All Costco 
employees must practice good grooming and personal hygiene to 
convey a neat, clean and professional image.”152 Pursuant to this 
policy, Costco asked a cashier with an eyebrow piercing to remove it, 
replace it with a clear retainer, or cover it.153 She refused, stating that 
she was a member of the Church of Body Modification (which had 
about 1000 members) and felt compelled to display her piercings at all 
times.154 Costco terminated her and she sued.155 Although the EEOC 
concluded that she had a valid religious discrimination claim and that 
the employer could not satisfy the undue hardship defense, the 
district court granted summary judgment to Costco and the First 
Circuit affirmed.156 The First Circuit stated that employees who 
regularly interact with customers “reflect on their employers,” that 
Costco had determined that facial piercings “detract from the ‘neat, 
clean and professional image’ that it aims to cultivate,” and that this 
was a business decision within Costco’s discretion.157 
Interestingly, the Cloutier court fully acknowledged that this was 
just a question of customer preference, rather than elevating it to 
something weightier (as the courts in the physical privacy BFOQ and 
English-language business necessity cases tend to do). “[I]t is not the 
law that customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter 
 
that his employer, in refusing to allow him to show his religious tattoos, failed to 
reasonably accommodate his practice of Kemetecism); Consent Decree at 1, EEOC v. 
Family Foods, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-00394-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 30, 2012) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review) (settling case alleging failure to accommodate long hair worn 
pursuant to employee’s Nazirite religious beliefs).  
 150. 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 151. Id. at 128–29. 
 152. Id. at 135. 
 153. Id. at 128. 
 154. Id. at 129. 
 155. Id. at 130. 
 156. Id. at 128, 130. 
 157. Id. at 135–36. 
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of law,” the court observed.158 Shortly thereafter, a district court 
within the First Circuit followed Cloutier to rule against a Rastafarian 
employee’s challenge to a clean-shavenness policy imposed by Jiffy 
Lube,159 while warning that “[i]f Cloutier’s language approving 
employer prerogatives regarding ‘public image’ is read broadly, the 
implications for persons asserting claims for religious discrimination 
in the workplace may be grave.”160 
That warning was prescient. Recently, in Camara v. Epps Air 
Service, Inc.,161 a magistrate judge rejected the discrimination claim of 
a Muslim employee who was told that she could not work as a 
customer service representative at an airport terminal while wearing a 
hijab162 because “[t]he perception that customers have of a business is 
critical to its success,”163 and some “[c]ustomers might have a 
problem” seeing an employee wearing a hijab in addition to her 
uniform.164 The Camara court went on to suggest that the employee 
should just accept a transfer to a non-customer-facing position165—a 
view that conflicts with the EEOC’s guidance on the topic.166 
2.  Avoidance of Proselytization or Judgment 
Unlike aesthetic appeal, the second big customer preference here 
is specific only to religion cases: the preference not to feel 
proselytized to or judged. This preference comes up when religious 
employees request an accommodation that allows them to (a) convey 
a religious message or (b) overtly decline to perform certain aspects 
 
 158. Id. at 136 (quoting EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 
1981)). 
 159. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9, 11–12 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 160. Id. at 17. 
 161. 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 162. Id. at 1319. 
 163. Id. at 1318. 
 164. Id. at 1322. 
 165. Id. at 1330 (stating that the employee’s refusal to accept the transfer was 
unreasonable and that she left the employer “no choice but to terminate her 
employment”). 
 166. See Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, 
supra note 148 (“May an employer assign an employee to a non-customer contact position 
because of customer preference? No. Assigning applicants or employees to a non-
customer contact position because of actual or feared customer preference violates Title 
VII’s prohibition on limiting, segregating, or classifying employees based on religion. Even 
if the employer is following its uniformly applied employee policy or practice, it is not 
permitted to segregate an employee due to fear that customers will have a biased response 
to religious garb or grooming. .	.	. [C]ustomer preference is not undue hardship.”). Federal 
courts, however, are not bound by EEOC guidance; rather, it is only binding to the extent 
that the courts find it persuasive. See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 53 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
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of the job, and the employer refuses on grounds that this 
accommodation will offend customers, rendering it unreasonable 
and/or an undue hardship. Courts have been quite receptive to these 
arguments. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, this is one of the most 
preferred preferences. 
In cases involving employees’ challenges to their employers’ 
refusal to let them convey religious messages to customers, employers 
generally win. In Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc.,167 for 
instance, an employer told an employee that she had to stop saying 
“Have a Blessed Day” when speaking or writing to customers, though 
they let her keep using the phrase with co-workers.168 The Seventh 
Circuit rejected her religious discrimination claim, holding that the 
employer had done enough to accommodate her.169 The religious 
speech was more extreme in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,170 
where an employee sought to post in his cubicle anti-gay Biblical 
quotes that would be visible to both colleagues and customers,171 and 
in Knight v. Connecticut Department of Public Health,172 where a 
nurse consultant and sign language interpreter argued that they had a 
Title VII right to proselytize to clients about topics including 
homosexuality and church attendance.173 Both the Ninth Circuit and 
Second Circuit, respectively, held that Title VII’s religious 
accommodation requirements did not require their employers to 
allow this speech, apparently because the speech was so likely to 
offend others.174 
Not only are courts sympathetic to employers’ desire not to 
offend customers, but they also often note that allowing such speech 
could expose the employer to liability. For example, the Peterson 
court, noting that the employee’s anti-gay speech might make his 
colleagues feel harassed, stated that “an employer need not 
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if doing so would result 
in discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of 
 
 167. 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 168. Id. at 473–74. 
 169. Id. at 476–77. 
 170. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 171. Id. at 601. 
 172. 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 173. Id. at 160–62. 
 174. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607–08 (noting the effect on colleagues); Knight, 275 F.3d at 
168 (focusing on the effect on clients). 
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contractual or other statutory rights.”175 Similarly, the Knight court 
pointed out that the Connecticut Department of Health was a 
government entity and that “[p]ermitting appellants to evangelize 
while providing services to clients would jeopardize the state’s ability 
to provide services in a religion-neutral matter.”176 
The case law is slightly more mixed about the role of customer 
preferences when a religious employee’s requested accommodation 
involves being excused from certain aspects of the job. Often, courts 
do not even delve into the likely customer response, because they rule 
for the employer on grounds that the particular accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship by requiring the employer to 
disproportionately burden current employees or hire a new employee, 
thereby imposing more than de minimis costs.177  
To the extent that the analysis does take potential customer 
response into account, the issue seems to be whether the employee’s 
opt-out would be actually visible to customers and upset them. In 
Bruff v. North Mississippi Health Services, Inc.,178 for example, a 
religious employee stated that she was willing to counsel gay clients, 
but was not willing to counsel them about their romantic/sexual 
relationships. She therefore sought to be allowed to refer them to 
other counselors when those matters came up.179 The Fifth Circuit 
held that this requested accommodation would indeed impose an 
 
 175. Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607 (citing Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. 
63, 81 (1977); and then citing Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 176. Knight, 275 F.3d at 168 (citing Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 
1020 (4th Cir. 1996); and then citing Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 
(8th Cir. 1995)). 
 177. See, e.g., Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581, 584–85 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (finding that a pharmacist’s request to be relieved of all counter and telephone 
duties to avoid participating in the distribution of birth control would “require[] other 
employees to assume a disproportionate workload” (citing Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., 
Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001)); Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 923, 925–
26 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that Title VII does not require police department to 
accommodate officer who refused to work at a casino for religious reasons in part because 
“[e]xcusing officers from the risk of unpopular assignments would create substantial costs 
for fellow officers who must step in, as well as the police force as an entity”); cf. Hellinger 
v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364–66 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that “[c]ase law 
supports the Defendant’s argument that having to hire an additional employee in the 
pharmacy department to work alongside the Plaintiff to ensure that the Plaintiff would 
never have to sell condoms is more than a de minimis cost,” but noting that there might be 
other reasonable accommodations that would not impose an undue hardship (citing 
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146 (5th Cir. 1982); and then citing Lee v. 
ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 178. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).  
 179. Id. at 497. 
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undue hardship on the employer.180 Although the court primarily 
focused on the burden that this would impose on her fellow 
counselors, the court also mentioned the discomfort that an abrupt 
referral would cause her clients, noting that psychological counseling 
involves “trust relationships developed over time.”181 The court 
further stated that, while the “logistical and economic impact” on the 
employer and other employees alone was enough to constitute an 
undue hardship, the “potential negative impact” on customers added 
weight to its decision.182 
By contrast, in Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp.,183 a federal district 
court allowed to proceed the religious discrimination claim of an 
Orthodox Jewish job applicant who was not hired by Eckerd for a 
pharmacist position because of his refusal to sell condoms.184 Eckerd 
had a policy of letting customers purchase over-the-counter items at 
the pharmacy counter, and there were times when the pharmacist 
might be the only employee at the counter.185 Eckerd argued that the 
only options for accommodating the plaintiff’s religious practice 
would be to hire an additional pharmacist to work side-by-side with 
the plaintiff, allow the plaintiff to refuse to sell condoms to customers, 
or request that the customers take condom purchases to another 
register.186 It further argued that all three options would impose 
undue hardships by cutting into profits and/or violating Eckerd’s 
customer service policy.187 The plaintiff responded by suggesting other 
accommodations, such as being scheduled to work during hours in 
which a clerk or pharmacy technician was also on duty at the 
 
 180. Id. at 503. 
 181. Id. at 501. 
 182. Id. at 501 n.15. 
 183. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 184. Id. at 1360–61. Note that numerous states have “conscience clauses” or “refusal 
laws” that give certain employees, particularly those providing healthcare services, the 
right to refuse to perform services relating to abortion or contraception. For a detailed 
chart of such laws, see Conscience and Refusal Clauses, REWIRE.NEWS (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/conscience-and-refusal-clauses/ [https://perma.
cc/469X-CHGH]. While these laws provide employees with certain state law protections or 
rights, they do not bear on whether such an employee can win a federal religious 
discrimination lawsuit under Title VII against an employer who declines to accommodate 
such practices. For a discussion of conscience clauses in the context of a pharmacist’s right 
to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions, see generally Karissa Eide, Comment, Can a 
Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 42 
CAL. W. L. REV. 121 (2005). 
 185. Hellinger, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (“Even in some stores that employ drug clerks 
and pharmacy technicians, there are times when the pharmacist may work alone.”). 
 186. Id. at 1364. 
 187. Id. 
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pharmacy counter to ring up sales.188 The court ruled that because 
there were still genuine disputes of material fact, summary judgment 
should be denied.189 Thus, the Hellinger court left open precisely what 
role potential customer offense should play in the analysis. It did 
somewhat minimize the concerns about customer offense by 
describing them as speculative, but it also emphasized the plaintiff’s 
evidence that there were ways to accommodate him that might be 
altogether invisible to the customer.190 
3.  Convenience 
The last preference that appears in the reasonable 
accommodation/undue hardship opening, albeit rarely, is the 
convenience preference. As with the BFOQ opening, convenience 
tends to be a supporting, rather than primary, preference. Recall that 
in the BFOQ context, courts have been receptive to the idea that 
same-sex service can become a BFOQ when the alternatives—such as 
having all females leave the restroom when a male custodian comes 
in, or having very long airport security screening lines to ensure that 
all pat-downs are performed by an employee of the same sex—will 
unacceptably inconvenience customers.191 
Similarly, employees’ refusal to perform certain aspects of a job 
for religious reasons may not only offend customers but also 
inconvenience them by forcing them to wait for or find another 
employee who can complete the task.192 Thus, just as the convenience 
preference can help create a BFOQ, so too can the convenience 
preference support the nonproselytization/judgment preference. In 
the latter context, the two preferences work together to yield the 
 
 188. Id. at 1366. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 192. One recent news story documented the ordeal of a woman who, after being 
diagnosed with an unviable pregnancy, faced a Walgreens pharmacist who refused to fill 
her prescription for medication that would induce a miscarriage. See Louis Lucero II, 
Walgreens Pharmacist Denies Woman with Unviable Pregnancy the Medication Needed to 
End It, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/walgreens-
pharmacist-pregnancy-miscarriage.html [https://perma.cc/9G58-XN4L (dark archive)]. 
Her Facebook post, which went viral, described not only the logistics of having to go to 
another Walgreens the next morning for the prescription but also the sadness and offense 
she felt: “I left Walgreens in tears, ashamed and feeling humiliated by a man who knows 
nothing of my struggles but feels it is his right to deny medication prescribed to me by my 
doctor.” Nicole Mone, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/nicole.
arteaga1?lst=1188816819%3A1599340517%3A1529802886 [https://perma.cc/Q8J4-QT5R 
(staff-uploaded archive)]. 
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conclusion that a requested accommodation is unreasonable and/or 
will impose an undue hardship.193 
The reasonable accommodation/undue hardship defense also 
appears in the ADA.194 Unlike religious discrimination cases, 
however, customer preferences are generally absent from employer 
defenses to claims of disability discrimination. This absence stems 
from the ADA’s stringent definition of undue hardship to mean 
“action requiring significant difficulty or expense,”195 as well as its 
parallel provision that reasonable accommodations can indeed 
include numerous forms of job modifications.196 Of course, there is 
still the potential for customer preferences to provide the basis of a 
successful employer defense here. For example, a disabled 
employee’s requested accommodation could theoretically be so 
upsetting to customers that it would impose significant difficulty on 
an employer, thus removing the obligation to provide it. But it is 
difficult to imagine such a situation. After all, accommodations for 
disabled employees are unlikely to offend customers in the way that 
certain religious accommodations, such as allowing proselytization, 
might. Furthermore, the customer inconveniences that might result 
from accommodations for disabled employees, while perhaps 
imposing more than a de minimis cost, are unlikely to reach the level 
of imposing a significant expense. Thus, it is unsurprising that so far 
there have been no cases along these lines. 
II.  A TAXONOMY OF THE PREFERRED PREFERENCES 
In the above discussion, six preferred preferences came to the 
fore: aesthetic appeal (in various forms), physical privacy from the 
opposite sex, psychological comfort with the same sex, an English-
speaking environment, avoidance of proselytization or judgment, and 
convenience. Each of these preferences has, at least occasionally, 
 
 193. For example, in Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x 581 (7th 
Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit ruled against a pharmacist, who was terminated after he 
placed customers on indefinite holds when they sought to fill birth control prescriptions, 
because the accommodation he requested (refusing to interact in any way with customers 
seeking birth control) imposed an undue hardship since the only alternatives were keeping 
customers waiting or forcing other employees to assume a disproportionate workload. Id. 
at 583–85. Thus, the convenience preference—both for customers and for colleagues—was 
likely relevant in the analysis. 
 194. See 42 U.S.C. §§	12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(a) (2012). 
 195. Id. §	12111(10)(A). 
 196. Id. §	12111(9) (including, as examples of reasonable accommodations, “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position .	.	. 
and other similar accommodations”). 
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formed the basis of a successful employer defense to what would 
otherwise seem like actionable discrimination. 
This Part hones in on each preference, looking across the 
different statutes and models of discrimination to evaluate the 
preference’s overall status as either strongly, moderately, or weakly 
preferred. The strongly preferred preferences are those to which 
courts frequently defer; the moderately preferred preferences are 
those to which courts sometimes defer; and the weakly preferred 
preferences are those to which courts occasionally defer. This 
Article’s examination of the case law indicates the strongly preferred 
preferences are physical privacy from the opposite sex, an English-
speaking environment, and avoidance of proselytization/judgment; 
the moderately preferred preferences are aesthetic appeal and 
convenience; and the weakly preferred preference is psychological 
comfort with the same sex. 
But why does the hierarchy shake out this way? This Article’s 
collective look at the preferred preferences illuminates a larger 
theme. Although courts do not explicitly say this, there are several 
interconnected reasons why these preferences are preferred, perhaps 
unconsciously so. As a threshold matter, the preferences intuitively 
strike courts as reasonable and natural, both because they do not 
seem invidiously discriminatory and because they align with ingrained 
social conventions and norms. Once that threshold is met, courts then 
(1) consider the preference much weightier than a mere preference 
and/or (2) view compliance with the preference as imposing only a 
minor burden on employees. Judicial deference to the preference, as 
this Article will show, varies according to the extent to which they 
find the above factors satisfied. 
This Part also considers a seventh possible preferred preference 
that is likely to come before courts soon: the customer preference for 
diversity, which large corporations are increasingly expressing in 
terms of, for instance, law firms’ staffing of their matters.197 Under the 
current approach, this is likely to become at most a weakly preferred 
preference, meaning that it will only rarely provide the basis for a 
successful employer defense. 
A. Aesthetic Appeal 
The aesthetic appeal preference appears frequently. It enters 
through three different customer preference openings: (1) the equal 
burdens doctrine for measuring whether disparate treatment has 
 
 197. See infra Section II.G. 
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occurred; (2) the job-related and consistent with business necessity 
defense to disparate impact claims; and (3) the reasonable 
accommodation/undue hardship limitation on employers’ obligation 
to accommodate their employees’ religious practices. 
Differential treatment based on appearance is a widely examined 
phenomenon in both law and social science. Indeed, a related debate 
in employment law is whether antidiscrimination laws should 
explicitly add appearance itself—whether limited to immutable 
physical attributes or also including choices like hairstyle, dress, body 
piercings, and makeup—as a protected characteristic.198 Some, though 
not many, state and local jurisdictions have adopted laws prohibiting 
some forms of appearance discrimination.199 For this Article’s 
purposes, however, the issue is narrower: whether customers’ 
expressed or assumed preferences relating to employee appearance 
can justify policies that adversely affect employees on the basis of 
already-protected characteristics under federal law like sex, race, and 
religion. Here, the challenged policies typically involve mutable 
aspects of appearance. 
For all three of the customer preference openings, we have seen 
that the aesthetic appeal preference can justify such policies—up to a 
point. Indeed, the status of the aesthetic appeal preference is quite 
consistent across the three different openings. Regardless of the 
domain, courts generally recognize that aesthetic appeal 
preferences—for things like fully made-up faces, clean-shavenness, no 
dreadlocks, no body piercings, and/or adherence to other appearance 
 
 198. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF 
APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 142–43, 154–55 (2010); Robert Post, Prejudicial 
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 
30–31 (2000); Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability? Evaluating the Legal 
Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 101, 121–22, 
135–37 (2016); Enbar Toledano, The Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 683, 685–86, 704–14 
(2013). 
 199. D.C. CODE §	2-1401.01 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on physical 
appearance); MICH. COMP. LAWS §	37.2102(1) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination based on 
height and weight); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33, §	3301 (2018) (prohibiting 
discrimination based on height or weight); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE 
§	9.83.010 (2017) (prohibiting discrimination based on “physical characteristics”); 
URBANA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. III, div. 1, §	12-39 (1975) (prohibiting 
discrimination based on personal appearance, defined as “weight, height, facial features, 
or other aspects of appearance”); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE §§	12.200(II), 
12.201(XV) (2008) (prohibiting discrimination based on personal appearance); 
BINGHAMTON, N.Y., CODE OF ORDINANCES §	45-2 (2008) (prohibiting discrimination 
based on height or weight); MADISON, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES §	39.03(1) (2018) 
(prohibiting discrimination based on physical appearance). 
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conventions—are indeed preferences, not necessities. But courts are 
still fairly deferential to many iterations of the aesthetic appeal 
preference, because they view the preferences as natural and 
reasonable, and do not consider it particularly burdensome for 
employees to comply. The limit only comes when an aesthetic appeal 
preference imposes such an obvious, differential burden in connection 
with a protected characteristic that courts cannot ignore it. 
The view of conventional aesthetic appeal preferences as natural 
and reasonable permeates the case law. In Craft, for instance, the 
Eighth Circuit deferred to the district court’s conclusion that “any 
extra attention to Craft was the gradual result of her indifference to 
the station’s legitimate need that she maintain a professional 
businesslike image appropriate to Kansas City.”200 Similarly, in 
Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit explicitly justified its ruling in favor of the 
employer by stating that for “grooming standards, the touch-stone is 
reasonableness.”201 As Robert Post has observed, courts seem to 
follow “the conviction that employers reasonably may impose sex-
based stereotypes in matters of grooming, so long as these stereotypes 
conform to traditional gender conventions.”202 
This attitude toward aesthetic appeal preferences is not limited 
to gender conventions. As discussed above, in Cloutier, the First 
Circuit viewed as reasonable Costco’s concern that a cashier with an 
eyebrow piercing would bother customers, explaining that it was 
within Costco’s discretion to promote a “neat, clean and professional 
image.”203 Similarly, in Camara, a magistrate judge ruled against a 
Muslim employee who sought to wear a hijab with her uniform,204 
noting that the employer’s denial of her request stemmed from its 
“policy requiring its employees to present a neat, professional 
appearance.”205 
Because these preferences align with courts’ views about what it 
means to be “professional,” they sometimes fail to recognize or 
acknowledge that the preferences can be burdensome on some 
employees in ways that directly implicate their sex, race, or religion. 
Both the Craft and Jespersen courts explicitly minimized the 
differential burdens that the hair and makeup expectations had on 
 
 200. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
 201. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(emphasis added). 
 202. Post, supra note 198, at 34. 
 203. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 204. Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 205. Id. at 1318. 
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female employees, insisting that they were roughly equal to those 
imposed on male employees, despite significant evidence to the 
contrary. Similarly, in Catastrophe Management Solutions, the 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “dreadlocks are a ‘natural 
outgrowth’ of the texture of black hair” but then immediately added 
that they were still “not .	.	. an immutable characteristic of race.”206 
The court later described the plaintiff’s refusal to cut her dreadlocks 
as a “personal decision.”207 The court thus implied that because 
dreadlocks were not literally immutable, it would not significantly 
burden African American female employees to comply with a no-
dreadlocks rule.208 
A variant of this nonburdensome rationale also appeared in 
Camara, where the court suggested that the Muslim employee’s need 
to wear a hijab had been reasonably accommodated by offering to 
transfer her to a position where customers could not see her.209 “If she 
wanted to wear a hijab at work, plaintiff had a duty to accept the 
transfer offer, but she did not,” the court reasoned.210 This is 
analogous to other courts’ apparent view that the plaintiff-employees 
could have simply worn more makeup or taken out their dreadlocks; 
if they chose not to do so, they had to live with the result. 
An interesting thought experiment is whether courts would be so 
deferential to an aesthetic requirement that deviated from convention. 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig has sketched out such a scenario, asking 
readers to consider what would happen if an employer required a 
white woman to wear her hair in cornrows, dreadlocks, or twists.211 
She predicts that “[m]any courts (and many people) in our society 
would find the notion of forcing white women to abide by a grooming 
policy that does not acknowledge or recognize the structure and 
 
 206. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g 
denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 207. Id. at 1035. 
 208. See id. at 1030 (differentiating “discrimination on the basis of black hair texture 
(an immutable characteristic)” with discrimination “on the basis of black hairstyle (a 
mutable choice)”). Significantly, the court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the 
EEOC’s and scholar’s briefing about the financial, psychological, and physical burdens 
imposed by the rule. See Greene, supra note 121, at 1011–14. 
 209. Camara, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 1327−28. 
 210. Id. at 1330. Not all courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., Muhammad v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 52 F. Supp. 3d 468, 473, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that an 
employee could go to trial on her claim that the New York City Transit Authority, in 
transferring her from a customer-contact position after she refused to remove or cover her 
khimar, failed to accommodate her practice of Islam). 
 211. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 119, at 1080−82. 
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texture of their hair ludicrous.”212 Similarly, Robert Post writes that it 
is only those employers whose requirements track gender-appearance 
conventions who tend to be “regarded as enforcing a ‘neutral’ 
baseline.”213 
As noted above, deference to the aesthetic appeal preference is 
not unlimited. When an employee can prove that such a preference 
imposes a significant, objectively measurable burden in connection 
with a protected characteristic, courts close the door to the relevant 
doctrinal opening through which the preference can enter. The cases 
rejecting nonanalogous body mass limits for male and female 
employees (e.g., large frame for men; medium frame for women) 
exemplify this limit, as does the developing solicitude for the burden 
placed on transgender employees forced to comply with requirements 
at odds with their gender identity. So does courts’ differential 
treatment of no-beard policies stemming from assumed customer 
preferences for clean-shavenness. Men have been successful in 
obtaining outright exemptions when they cannot shave because of an 
objective medical condition,214 but fare less well in court when they 
wear beards for religious reasons.215 In the latter context, the 
possibility of an outright exemption is not discussed; instead, the only 
judicial analysis is of whether the religious plaintiffs were entitled to 
be transferred to a non-customer-contact position.216 
One possible explanation for the differential treatment is that the 
two no-beard situations implicate two different customer preference 
openings: respectively, the business necessity opening within 
disparate impact liability versus the reasonable 
accommodation/undue hardship opening within religious 
 
 212. Id. at 1082. 
 213. Post, supra note 198, at 29. 
 214. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993); Johnson 
v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 713 F. Supp. 244, 247–48 (W.D. Tenn. 1989); Richardson v. Quik 
Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (S.D. Iowa 1984). 
 215. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 315 & n.1, 320–21 (7th Cir. 
1996) (remanding case for trial on the question of whether UPS had, in fact, offered to a 
religious, beard-wearing employee the reasonable accommodation of a comparable non-
public-contact position); Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 14−15, 17 (D. 
Mass. 2006) (suggesting that if the employer offered a bearded employee a transfer to a 
comparable position, that would have been a reasonable accommodation, and ultimately 
concluding that the employer made out its undue hardship defense anyway); EEOC v. 
Sambo’s of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89–92 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (rejecting claim of Sikh 
restaurant employee who wore a beard for religious reasons on the grounds that 
customers viewed beards as unsanitary and “that no reasonable accommodation can be 
made without undue hardship”). As noted above, this is an area where the courts and the 
EEOC sometimes part company. 
 216. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d at 319–20. 
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discrimination liability. It is notable, however, that the identical 
language about the need for reasonable accommodations for bearded 
men has been used by courts in both contexts. Indeed, the Eighth 
Circuit specifically borrowed the reasonable accommodation standard 
to explain in Bradley why Domino’s deliverymen suffering from PFB 
deserved outright exemptions from the beard ban.217 
Thus, the key factor for whether courts defer to an aesthetic 
preference seems not to be the doctrinal opening in which it appears: 
equal burdens; business necessity; or reasonable 
accommodation/undue hardship. Rather, the outcome-determinative 
question is how compelling the court finds the burden imposed on the 
employee. Courts tend to be more moved by the plight of men who 
cannot shave for medical reasons than of those who wear beards for 
religious reasons, just as they are more moved by the burden that sex-
based appearance codes place on transgender employees than on 
cisgender employees.218 
Because courts defer to the aesthetic appeal preference 
somewhat frequently—at least absent relatively extreme 
circumstances—this Article classifies it as moderately preferred. 
B. Physical Privacy from the Opposite Sex 
The physical privacy preference is, in some ways, related to the 
aesthetic appeal preference. Both preferences involve bodies: the 
aesthetic appeal preference involves the employee’s body, while the 
physical privacy preference involves the customer’s nude body (and 
sometimes its tactile interaction with the employee’s body). 
Moreover, both preferences often implicate aspects of body 
stereotyping—what Noa Ben-Asher describes as “stereotyping along 
the male/female binary for a range of regulatory purposes.”219 As 
Ben-Asher explains, although sex discrimination based on division-of-
labor stereotyping is typically unlawful, sex discrimination based on 
body stereotyping is often permissible.220 Both the aesthetic appeal 
 
 217. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 799 (importing the “reasonable accommodation” language from 
the context of religious accommodation into the context of disparate impact by stating “we 
hold only that reasonable accommodation must be made for members of the protected 
class who suffer from PFB” (emphasis added)). 
 218. See YURACKO, supra note 34, at 98. 
 219. Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1191 
(2016). 
 220. Id. at 1192 (“[T]hree types of reasoning have supported the permissible branch of 
sex-stereotyping law. The first type is reasoning from cultural or community norms. A 
prominent contemporary example of this is the validation of sex-based appearance codes 
.	.	.	. The second type of reasoning when validating body stereotyping is from ‘real’ 
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preference and the physical privacy preference fall into the body-
stereotyping category, connecting up with traditional gender-based 
conventions about appearance, modesty, and heterosexual desire. 
The physical privacy preference, however, has a narrower and 
deeper bite than the aesthetic appeal preference. It shows up in only 
one opening—the BFOQ defense to intentional sex discrimination—
and receives great deference there. And, of course, this is true even 
though the preference implicates a protected characteristic right on its 
face. Why does this preference carry so much weight? I suggest that it 
is because it scores very highly on the considerations listed above: 
privacy for one’s nude body from the opposite sex is very ingrained in 
our society, so much so that courts view it more as a need than a 
preference. Additionally, while the burden factor might seem to cut 
the other way—a real burden is certainly imposed on a job applicant 
who is not hired because of his or her sex—the preference does not 
necessarily favor either sex in the aggregate. 
Yuracko has insightfully dissected why the physical privacy 
preference is so strongly preferred.221 “The idea that individuals’ 
associational preferences have different degrees of legitimacy and 
should be given different degrees of social respect is not new,” she 
argues.222 Physical privacy preferences sit at the top of the hierarchy 
because they are so closely tied to one’s “sense of self.”223 Courts are 
quite explicit about this view: in one of the early BFOQ labor nurse 
cases, for example, the court wrote that “the body involves the most 
sacred and meaningful of all privacy rights,”224 adding that the desire 
for physical modesty “is impelled by elementary self-respect and 
personal dignity.”225 Indeed, courts often assert that these desires are 
more than preferences. As one district court explained in a restroom 
case, “[m]ore is involved .	.	. than a mere preference by customers for 
one method of operation over another. The policy at issue in the 
instant case involves a recognition of a fundamental concern over the 
 
biological differences. An example of this is a line of cases that affirm the inferior status of 
unwed fathers .	.	.	. The third type of reasoning in support of body stereotyping is from 
heterosexual risk and privacy. An example of this is the validation of sex-segregated 
spaces .	.	.	.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 221. See generally Yuracko, supra note 7 (analyzing courts’ rhetoric in explaining and 
defending the difference between permissible and impermissible sex discrimination in 
employment). 
 222. Id. at 191. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as 
moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 225. Id. (quoting York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)). 
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exposure of one’s body in the presence of a member of the opposite 
sex.”226 
Particularly interesting is that courts began holding female sex to 
be a BFOQ for labor nurse positions even at a time (the late 1970s) 
when most OB-GYNs were still male.227 Yuracko hypothesizes that 
“[c]ourts tolerate[d] this seeming illogic because what is important is 
not protecting privacy per se, but protecting privacy preferences, 
which courts deem to be deeply intertwined with individuals’ sense of 
self.”228 Indeed, courts often reach these sorts of conclusions on 
summary judgment motions, holding that a trial is unnecessary. 
Numerous scholars, including Noa Ben-Asher, Amy Kapczynski, 
and Naomi Schoenbaum, have also argued that heteronormative 
assumptions are at the core of the physical privacy BFOQ. They 
assert that courts defer to this preference (and/or that customers 
express it in the first place) out of the misplaced view that sexual 
desire can only exist between an employee and customer of the 
opposite sex.229 “The same-sex BFOQ responds to this presumed 
heterosexual desire by denying opposite sex contact,” Ben-Asher 
writes.230 In other words, these scholars accuse courts of wrongly 
assuming that there cannot be sexual tension when an employee sees 
a same-sex customer naked, and deferring to the customer preference 
for same-sex service on that basis. Although this represents an 
incomplete picture of why courts have been so deferential to this 
BFOQ—it seems unlikely, for instance, that courts are focused on 
sexual attraction or tension when they defer to laboring women’s 
desire for a female nurse—it is certainly a piece of the puzzle. 
Not only does the physical privacy BFOQ preference dovetail 
with an ingrained social convention, to the point where it strikes 
courts as a need, but there is also an argument that the burden it 
imposes with respect to sex is not unacceptably large. Although the 
 
 226. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1421 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citing 
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physical privacy preference definitely results in individual harms, 
there is a “symmetry of exclusion” here, as Yuracko puts it.231 She 
explains, “[t]here is at least a theoretical parity to sex-based hiring on 
behalf of privacy: while women may be denied certain jobs to protect 
men’s privacy, men will be denied the same range of jobs to protect 
women’s privacy.”232 Of course, this may not hold true in practice. If, 
for instance, women are more concerned about physical privacy in 
certain situations than men are, there may still be a differential 
burden in the aggregate. Similarly, as Yuracko points out, there are 
some jobs where the “customers” are exclusively or mostly of one 
sex.233 At least theoretically, however, there is some opportunity for 
distributional parity. And, of course, there is a limited universe of 
jobs that involve seeing naked customers. 
Because courts consistently defer to the physical privacy 
preference once customer nudity is involved, this Article classifies the 
preference as strongly preferred. 
C. Psychological Comfort with the Same Sex 
As we have seen, the story changes dramatically when customer 
nudity drops out of the picture. Once a preference for same-gender 
service or care cannot be framed as a desire for physical privacy from 
the opposite sex—and instead rests on psychological comfort with the 
same sex (sometimes referred to as “therapeutic privacy”)—much of 
the judicial deference dissolves and the BFOQ defense is rejected. 
Although the psychological comfort preference occasionally gets 
deference, it is the most weakly preferred preference in the hierarchy. 
Ironically, some of the physical privacy cases are themselves 
really more about psychological comfort than physical modesty.234 In 
particular, many articles about women’s preferences for female OB-
GYNs indicate that for those women who do prefer female OB-
GYNs (slightly over half of all American women, according to one 
recent meta-analysis),235 the desire comes not from unease about 
having male doctors examine their bodies but from a greater comfort 
 
 231. Yuracko, supra note 7, at 181. 
 232. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 233. Id. (providing the example of working in an OB-GYN unit). 
 234. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal 
for Expansion of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
357 (2004) (discussing the reasons for preferences for female OB-GYNs and the legal 
ramifications of those reasons). 
 235. Kyle J. Tobler, et al., Gender Preference of the Obstetrician Gynecologist Provider: 
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 127 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY (SUPP.) 43S, 
43S (2016). 
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level in discussing intimate topics like sex drive.236 Relatedly, some 
women believe that female OB-GYNs can better appreciate their 
specific concerns about issues like menstruation, childbirth, and 
menopause, given their shared experience.237 All-female OB-GYN 
practices sometimes market themselves along precisely those lines.238 
Analogous psychological comfort preferences are also expressed 
by men. A January 2018 New York Times article about the increase in 
male nurses described the physical and psychological privacy interests 
that can lead male patients to prefer male nurses in certain 
situations.239 One male student nurse at a VA hospital, for example, 
stated that “I work on this floor with people who just had urology 
surgery or amputations, and they have told me that when I come in 
the room and shut the door behind me, they feel more understood 
and can drop the tough guy attitude.”240 Another article described 
men’s greater comfort level with male healthcare providers for certain 
forms of plastic surgery, such as penile enlargement.241 
Somewhat surprisingly, there have not been many legal 
challenges to preferential hiring of female OB-GYNs, the most well-
known example of this phenomenon. The only decision is Veleanu v. 
Beth Israel Medical Center,242 which involved the related question of 
whether a medical practice’s policy of accommodating patients’ 
requests to see female OB-GYNs amounted to discrimination against 
the male plaintiff OB-GYN.243 The court held that it did not, citing 
the labor nurse cases and stating that “female patients may have a 
legitimate privacy interest in seeking to have female doctors perform 
their gynecological examinations.”244 But as more such challenges are 
 
 236. Waldman, supra note 234, at 379–80. 
 237. Id. at 379. 
 238. See, e.g., All About Women - Tower Health Medical Group, TOWER HEALTH, 
https://reading.towerhealth.org/locations/profile/?id=329 [http://perma.cc/98VT-T2C4]. One 
Pennsylvania practice’s website, for example, states:  
Just like their patients, All About Women providers are are [sic] mothers, 
daughters, sisters, wives, and friends. As women, they too understand the joy of 
childbirth and life’s milestones experienced by women of all ages. That personal 
insight gives them a unique approach to treating patients and providing the best in 
women’s healthcare. 
Id. 
 239. Claire Cain Miller, The Time Is Ripe for Male Nurses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2018, at 
B1. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Abby Ellin, Refuge in the Company of Men, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at D8. 
 242. No. 98 CIV. 7455(VM), 2000 WL 1400965 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000). 
 243. Id. at *8. 
 244. Id. 
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brought, it is a safe prediction that the physical privacy argument will 
carry the laboring oar for the defense, even though psychological 
comfort may be a more accurate label for what is actually occurring.245 
Why does a same-gender preference that is more about mind 
than body get so much less deference? The easy answer is that, even 
though the psychological comfort preference does align with certain 
social conventions about male-female interactions, and thus the 
threshold requirement is met, courts are much quicker to dismiss it as 
a “mere preference” rather than a need. As noted above, for 
example, the Hi 40 Corp. court was very skeptical of a diet center’s 
defense that its almost exclusively female clientele expressed a strong 
preference for discussing weight-loss and body-image concerns with 
female counselors.246 The court acknowledged that customers were 
actually expressing these sentiments but viewed them as irrelevant.247 
Indeed, the court stated that it did “not accept the proposition that .	.	. 
customers have a privacy interest that extends to the counseling 
function,” because “real privacy interests .	.	. only extend to” the 
physical concerns.248 
But that doctrinal approach, of course, just begs the question of 
why physical privacy preferences are so much more compelling to 
courts. Here, Ben-Asher’s emphasis on the salience of body 
stereotyping is particularly relevant. As Ben-Asher writes, courts 
consistently reject division-of-labor stereotyping, i.e., differential 
treatment stemming from traditional presumptions about “men’s 
work” versus “women’s work.”249 But courts are more willing to 
accept body stereotyping, i.e., differential treatment for male and 
female bodies, on grounds that such stereotypes are linked to ‘“real’ 
biological differences” between men and women.250 Once there is no 
customer nudity and the body is less salient, the cases seem to shift 
from the favored body-stereotyping category into the disfavored 
division-of-labor category. 
 
 245. See Paul-Emile, supra note 42, at 486 (stating that, “unlike the prototypical BFOQ 
situation, the relationship between physician and patient in the hospital context is not 
defined by issues of personal modesty but is instead fundamentally diagnostic and 
therapeutic”). 
 246. EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301, 303, 305–06 (W.D. Mo. 1996). 
 247. See id. at 303, 305. 
 248. Id. at 304 (emphasis added); see also Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 
1052, 1068 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that female sex may not be a BFOQ for a massage 
therapist position because the massage did not involve complete nudity). 
 249. Ben-Asher, supra note 219, at 1190–92. 
 250. Id. at 1192. 
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In addition to faring poorly on the need versus preference issue, 
the psychological comfort preference prompts courts to express more 
concern about the burden imposed on the disfavored employees.251 
There are two likely reasons for this. First, the burden imposed by the 
physical privacy preference is at least limited to the small universe of 
occupations that involve seeing or touching a customer’s naked body. 
Once psychological comfort enters the mix, courts may be worried 
about the potential for a slippery slope. Second, although courts have 
never articulated this, there may be some concern that this preference 
will particularly favor women—i.e., that psychological comfort with 
the same gender tends to be expressed more by female than male 
customers. There is indeed some empirical support for this possible 
concern, particularly with respect to therapist preference.252 
That said, even here, courts will occasionally defer to the 
preference. As discussed above, in Healey, the Third Circuit accepted 
a psychiatric hospital’s argument that its children and adolescent 
patients needed same-sex care because of both psychological 
concerns (including the need for role modeling and greater comfort 
discussing menstruation and sexuality) as well as physical concerns 
(since young patients sometimes needed to be bathed).253 The court’s 
extended discussion of the patients’ psychological interests here 
suggests that it would have ruled this way even without the physical 
bathing concern, but it is hard to know for sure.254 
 
 251. See, e.g., Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. at 304–05 (minimizing the psychological 
interest of the female customers and concluding that, “[o]n the other hand, the 
employment restriction utilized by Physicians Weight Loss, namely the refusal to hire 
male counselors, has a dramatic impact on the employment opportunity of male 
applicants. .	.	. [T]he privacy interests of customers cannot be used to justify a policy of not 
hiring male counselors because the minimal impact of male counselors on the privacy 
interests of customers is outweighed by the substantial impact on the employment 
opportunities of male applicants.”). 
 252. See, e.g., Sara J. Landes et al., Women’s Preference of Therapist Based on Sex of 
Therapist and Presenting Problem: An Analog Study, 26 COUNSELLING PSYCHOL. Q. 330, 
337 (2013) (surveying female college students and finding that “[e]ighty-seven percent of 
the women surveyed preferred the female therapist, regardless of the presenting 
problem”); Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, Client Preferences for Therapist 
Gender, 10 J.C. STUDENT PSYCHOTHERAPY 35, 39 (1996) (surveying 116 college students 
and finding that 56% of women preferred a female therapist while 58% of men had no 
preference); Matthew B. Wintersteen, Janell L. Mensinger & Guy S. Diamond, Do 
Gender and Racial Differences Between Patient and Therapist Affect Therapeutic Alliance 
and Treatment Retention in Adolescents?, 36 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 400, 400 
(2005) (summarizing research findings as indicating that “[g]enerally, female patients tend 
to prefer female therapists”). 
 253. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133–34 (3d Cir. 1996).  
 254. Id. (stating that it had reached its BFOQ conclusion “due to both therapeutic and 
privacy concerns”); see also Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 583–86 (7th Cir. 
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Because courts only rarely defer to the preference for 
psychological comfort with the same sex, this Article classifies the 
preference as weakly preferred. 
D. English-Only Environment 
In light of courts’ skepticism toward customers’ psychological 
privacy interests, the significant judicial deference to the next 
customer preference—an English-only environment—is striking. This 
preference enters through one opening—the business necessity 
defense to disparate impact—and is often successful in court. Courts 
typically accept that such policies have a disparate impact based on 
national origin, but then conclude that the policies are justified by 
business necessity because they respond to customer preference. 
If this preference were limited to English-speaking customers’ 
desire for employees to speak English in their interactions with them, 
it would be unsurprising that it fares so well. But the preference is 
broader than that. In numerous cases, employers have said that 
employees have to speak English whenever they are in the customers’ 
presence—and courts have been deferential.255  
Once again, the above-described factors illuminate how courts 
reach that result. As an initial matter, in keeping with the threshold 
requirement described previously,256 courts view this preference as 
 
2008) (accepting that same-sex juvenile counselors might be necessary during the daytime 
shifts in order to perform the “direct role modeling/mentoring form of supervision” most 
effectively, but rejecting the employer’s argument that this was necessary at night because 
the juveniles were sleeping most of that time). 
 255. It is important to note, however, that courts are much less deferential when the 
rule requires employees to speak English at all times, even outside customers’ presence. 
See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999) 
(noting the distinction between rules that apply to all times and places and those that are 
more limited). Regulations also differentiate between rules that require “employees to 
speak only English at all times in the workplace,” which are viewed as presumptively 
violating Title VII, and English-only rules that are applied “only at certain times,” which 
can be permissible if “justified by business necessity.” 29 C.F.R. §	1606.7(a)–(b) (2018). 
That said, the EEOC’s guidance expresses some skepticism even about the latter category 
of cases. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.005, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION §	V(C)(3)(d)(2) 
(2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/national-origin-guidance.cfm [http://perma.cc/
4GHL-GN5N] (“If coworkers or customers are concerned about exposure to languages 
they do not understand, or about gossip in these languages, one approach is to address 
these concerns on an individualized basis without resorting to language-restrictive policies. 
A language-restrictive policy that has a disparate impact on a particular group cannot be 
justified if an employer can effectively promote safe and efficient business operations 
through a policy that does not disproportionately harm protected national origin groups.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 256. See supra Part II. 
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reasonable and not invidiously discriminatory. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the Sephora case. In deferring to Sephora’s assertion 
that customers preferred salespeople to speak English in their 
presence, the court stated that “[h]elpfulness, politeness and 
approachability .	.	. are central to the job of a sales employee at a 
retail establishment, and are distinct from customers’ prejudices.”257 
From there, the Sephora court quickly segued into elevating the 
preference beyond a mere preference. Indeed, the Sephora court 
suggested that the customer preference for an English-only 
environment was not a preference, stating that “as we explained 
above we do not believe Sephora’s justifications rest on customer 
preference.”258 In other words, once the preference did not reflect a 
prejudice, it was not even a “preference” at all.259 
Particularly telling is that courts generally decline even to 
evaluate whether customers actually feel disturbed by hearing 
employees converse in languages other than English. In Kania v. 
Archdiocese of Philadelphia,260 for instance, the district court deferred 
to the archdiocese’s rule that employees could not speak Polish at all 
during business hours, speculating that speaking a language other 
than English could “alienat[e] .	.	. perhaps church members 
themselves.”261 The Kania court’s speculation about church members’ 
reactions was not backed up by any evidence,262 and the Sephora 
court specifically stated that none was needed: “Sephora need not 
demonstrate that a particular percentage of customers’ opinions 
corroborate its business judgment that certain behavior is impolite 
and unhelpful. We ‘do[] not sit as a super-personnel department 
.	.	.	.’”263 This passage was later approvingly cited by Pacheco.264 In 
short, courts are so willing to accept the validity of the potential 
customer concern here that they somewhat take it on faith from the 
employer. 
 
 257. EEOC v. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. Indeed, in the same discussion, the Sephora court reiterated that “[w]hen 
salespeople speak in a language customers do not understand, the effects on helpfulness, 
politeness and approachability are real and are not a matter of abstract preference.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 260. 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 261. Id. at 731, 736. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Scaria v. Rubin, 
117 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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Finally, courts are quick to dismiss any burden that limited 
English-only rules impose on employees whose native language is not 
English.265 Once again, as with the aesthetic appeal cases, there is a 
lurking assumption that this is just about choice and that the plaintiff-
employees are being unreasonable by objecting. “Kania admits that 
she is bilingual,”266 the Kania court wrote. “Because she could have 
readily complied with the English-only rule, it did not cause a legally 
cognizable adverse impact .	.	.	.”267 The Pacheco court similarly 
reasoned that “[t]he alleged difficulty Plaintiff had in not lapsing into 
Spanish is belied by Plaintiff’s testimony that he is fully bilingual in 
English and Spanish,”268 and also pointed out that the plaintiff could 
still speak Spanish outside of patients’ presence.269 
An important parallel exists between courts’ deference to the 
English-only preference and to many iterations of the aesthetic 
appeal preference, particularly those that implicate race and ethnicity, 
such as rules prohibiting dreadlocks. As Camille Gear Rich explains, 
both categories involve employees’ “race/ethnicity performance,” 
which she defines as “any behavior or voluntarily displayed attribute 
which, by accident or design, communicates racial or ethnic identity 
or status,” including hairstyle, language, and the like.270 Even though 
the employees regard these choices as “an essential part of their racial 
or ethnic identity,” Rich writes, courts view them as a “marginal 
concern, beyond the scope of [Title VII’s] protections.”271 Indeed, as 
this Article has shown, courts reach that conclusion through a two-
step maneuver: viewing the applicable preference as a reasonable 
desire for professionalism or even a virtual need, and then minimizing 
the burden imposed by the preference on the affected employee. 
Because courts consistently defer to the customer preference for 
an English-only environment in their presence, this Article classifies 
the preference as strongly preferred. 
E. Avoidance of Proselytization or Judgment 
Although the English-only preference involves employees’ 
language outside the customer-employee interaction, the next 
 
 265. See, e.g., Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
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preference implicates the customer-employee interaction itself. This 
customer preference—not wanting to receive any proselytization or 
judgment from employees—enters through one opening: the 
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship limitation on employers’ 
obligation to accommodate their employees’ religious practices. And 
it receives great deference here. 
It is important to separate this preference from the related issue 
of whether employers have to accommodate employees’ religious 
views in ways that are invisible to the customer—such as, for instance, 
reassigning job responsibilities so that the employee will not perform 
certain duties or work at certain times.272 Those situations, too, 
typically implicate questions of reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship (e.g., cost, burden on other employees, administrative 
complications, and so on).273 This specific preference, however, 
implicates a narrower question: whether an accommodation that will 
cause potential customer offense imposes, by reason of that customer 
offense, an undue hardship. As explained above, this can happen in 
two situations: (1) the employee’s insistence on proselytizing to 
customers or (2) the employee’s visible refusal to assist customers 
with certain tasks due to religious objections. 
In both situations, the court usually sides with the employer. 
Courts generally view this interest as more than a mere preference; 
indeed, in some situations where the religious expression itself 
conveys prejudice, customers’ own legal rights can be at stake.274 Even 
when they are not, courts quite clearly view the preference as 
reasonable.275 Similarly, courts are comfortable with the burden that 
this preference imposes on religious employees, often implying that 
the employee is the one being unreasonable. In Bruff, for instance, 
the Fifth Circuit stated—in rejecting a therapist’s request to counsel 
only on topics that did not conflict with her religion—that “[a]n 
employee has a duty to cooperate in achieving accommodation of his 
or her religious beliefs, and must be flexible in achieving that end.”276 
Similarly, in Anderson, the Seventh Circuit rejected an employee’s 
 
 272. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 1998) 
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claim that the employer had to let her say “Have a Blessed Day” to 
all customers, emphasizing that the employer had done enough by 
letting her use the phrase with colleagues and display religious objects 
in her work area.277 The only such case that survived summary 
judgment was Hellinger. Even there, however, the precise basis for 
the court’s holding was unclear, and it seems to have been partially 
based on the potential for an accommodation that would be invisible 
(and thus inoffensive) to the customer. 
Because courts almost always defer to the customer preference 
not to be proselytized to or overtly judged by employees, this Article 
classifies it as strongly preferred.278 
 
 277. Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473–74, 477 (7th Cir. 
2001). 
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Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), courts will become more 
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bakery owner who raised a free exercise claim after being sanctioned by the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission for refusing to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, 
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Supreme Court’s precise holding was narrow in that it was based on purported hostility to 
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deferential to religious accommodation claims in the free exercise context, that is unlikely 
to affect the Title VII employment discrimination context addressed by this Article. For 
this Article’s purposes, the relevant scenario would be as follows: (1) a bakery owner hires 
an employee who refuses to take an order from a same-sex couple for a wedding cake, 
contrary to the bakery’s own policy; (2) the owner terminates the employee; (3) the 
employee brings a Title VII lawsuit alleging that the employer failed to reasonably 
accommodate his religion; and (4) the employer defends itself from the Title VII claim by 
pointing to the customer preference for avoidance of proselytization or judgment. 
In other words, our hypothetical bakery owner would argue that allowing a religious 
employee to reject a same-sex couple’s wedding cake order would not be a reasonable 
accommodation and would impose an undue hardship because of the likely customer 
offense that would ensue. Given the very low threshold for undue hardship in the Title VII 
religious discrimination context (anything more than a de minimis cost), it would be an 
easy showing to make. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Alaska Airlines Apologizes to Gay Couple 
Asked to Move for Straight Couple, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/01/business/alaska-airline-apology-gay-couple-seats.html [http://perma.cc/668J-MAK8 
(dark archive)] (describing the public furor against Alaska Airlines after an incident when a 
gay couple on the plane was asked to move so that a straight couple could sit next to each 
other). In short, for the outcomes to change materially here, Title VII’s undue hardship 
standard would have to be substantially raised. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018) 
142 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
F. Convenience 
The convenience preference is only a minor player in the 
preferred preference hierarchy. It usually functions as a supporting 
preference for two of the strongly preferred preferences: physical 
privacy from the opposite sex and avoidance of 
proselytization/judgment. 
In the physical privacy context, convenience typically connects 
with the question of whether employers can accommodate customers’ 
physical privacy preferences through careful scheduling of timing and 
shifts. This arises in two settings: restrooms and nursing 
homes/hospitals. Courts have generally suggested that, if such careful 
scheduling can be easily accomplished, then that is the better 
approach for satisfying the physical privacy preference (as opposed to 
only hiring employees of one sex for the position). 
On the other hand, if such scheduling would impose nontrivial 
inconveniences on customers, then the sex BFOQ permits employers 
to hire employees of one sex for the position. For example, in 
Hernandez v. University of Saint Thomas,279 the district court accepted 
the argument that having male custodians service women’s restrooms 
might lead to inconveniences (because those restrooms would have to 
be closed during the cleaning, leading to overcrowding in the other 
bathrooms).280 The court thus rejected the employee’s motion for 
summary judgment, suggesting that if at trial the university could 
support its contention that “any alternatives to a sex-based policy 
would significantly decrease the efficiency and the quality of custodial 
operations,” then it could prevail on its BFOQ defense.281 
A similar approach applies to customers’ preference to avoid 
employees’ proselytization or judgment: if it is easy and inexpensive 
to reassign duties to shield the customer from this experience, then 
the reassignment is likely to be a reasonable accommodation.282 
 
 279. 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 280. Id. at 218. 
 281. Id. (explaining that there was a genuine issue of fact as to how disruptive the 
alternatives would be and stating that “[a]t some point, a high degree of added cost, 
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 282. See Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
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However, if such reassignment would materially inconvenience 
customers—say, by requiring them to undergo a long wait for another 
employee—employers are not required to take this approach. In 
Noesen v. Medical Staffing Network,283 for instance, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the religious discrimination claim of a pharmacist 
who was fired after refusing to play any role in helping customers who 
were attempting to order birth control, including “even briefly talking 
to customers seeking contraception.”284 The court accepted the 
employer’s position that, “due to high caller volume [the plaintiff], 
like all other staff, needed to answer the telephones.”285 Thus, just as 
in the sex BFOQ situation, the convenience preference works with 
the nonproselytization/judgment preference to create a successful 
employer defense. 
Unlike most of the other preferences, convenience is entirely a 
matter of degree: a one-minute wait is obviously very different from a 
twenty-minute wait, let alone a one-hour wait. The greater the 
inconvenience, the more likely courts are to defer to the preference, 
because then it seems closer to a need. Because the level of 
preference deference here varies depending on the inconvenience 
involved and its interaction with another preference, this Article 
classifies the convenience preference as moderately preferred. 
G. Diversity? 
I conclude this section by considering a potential new preferred 
preference: diversity. Customers—particularly large clients of law 
firms—have increasingly expressed this preference in recent years in 
regard to the composition of the team working on their matters.286 In 
 
 283. 232 F. App’x 581 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 284. Id. at 583–85. 
 285. Id. at 583–84 (“Wal-Mart contends, and we agree, that [the plaintiff’s] proposed 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship. It is undisputed that Wal-Mart’s 
relieving [the plaintiff] of all telephone and counter duties would have shifted his share of 
initial customer contact to other pharmacy staff.”). Interestingly, here the employer 
actually offered the employee the option of referring callers with birth control issues to 
others, but the employee refused the offer and was only willing to place the customers on 
an indefinite hold. Id. at 583. Thus, the court did not have to rule on whether, had the 
employer not offered this accommodation, it would have been required to do so under 
Title VII.  
 286. See Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A Market-Based 
Argument for Law Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 25–28 (2009); Stacy Hawkins, 
How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Standard: Mounting an Effective Title 
VII Defense of the Commitment to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2457, 2460 (2015) (“[L]egal employers face increasing demands from external stakeholders 
to produce demonstrable evidence of success in achieving these diversity goals.”); 
Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender Equity in Law 
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2017, Facebook announced that it would require “women and ethnic 
minorities [to] account for at least 33 percent of law firm teams 
working on its matters,”287 while HP announced that it would 
withhold up to 10% of bills from firms that do not meet its diversity 
criteria (which include a numerical minimum for how many female 
and ethnically diverse attorneys must work on their matters).288 
Corporations including MetLife,289 Microsoft,290 and Shell291 have 
taken similar steps. Retired Federal District Judge Shira Scheindlin 
recently wrote a New York Times op-ed encouraging other 
 
Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1062 (2011); Clare Tower Putnam, Comment, 
When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Among Its Own Employees to Meet a Client’s 
Request? Reflections on the ACC’s Call to Action, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 658 
(2007); Lisa Kirby & Caren Ulrich Stacy, Client Call for Greater Diversity at Fever Pitch, 
LAW.COM (July 17, 2017), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/07/17/client-call-for-
greater-diversity-at-fever-pitch/ [https://perma.cc/8GHC-FJKH].  
 287. Ellen Rosen, Facebook Pushes Outside Law Firms on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
3, 2017, at B2. 
 288. Letter from Kim M. Rivera, HP Chief Legal Officer, to Law Firm Partners (Feb. 
8, 2017), http://www8.hp.com/us/en/images/Diversity_Holdback_Open_Letter_to_Law_
Firms_tcm245_2406164_tcm245_2403754_tcm245-2406164.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8EH-L98D] 
(instructing all U.S.-based law firms with at least ten attorneys that, “[i]n order to comply 
with the requirement, firms must field (i) at least one diverse Firm relationship partner, 
regularly engaged with HP on billing and staffing issues; or (ii) at least one woman and 
one racially/ethnically diverse attorney, each performing or managing at least 10% of the 
billable hours worked on HP matters”). 
 289. Casey Sullivan, Deadline for Diversity Issued by Top MetLife Lawyer, BIG L. BUS. 
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/deadline-for-diversity-issued-by-top-metlife-
lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/MAQ8-JBAH] (“[MetLife General Counsel] plans to give law 
firms until June 2018 to present MetLife with a formal talent development plan that shows 
how they will promote and retain diverse lawyers. If the plan is not acceptable the outside 
law firm will have until December 2018 to revise its plan, although there will be no third 
try after that.”). 
 290. Letter from Brad Smith, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Microsoft Corp., 
to Microsoft’s Premier Preferred Provider Firms (July 31, 2015) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review); Brad Smith, Announcing the Next Generation of Microsoft’s Law 
Firm Diversity Program: Working Towards a More Diverse and Inclusive Legal Profession, 
MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Aug. 4, 2015), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/
08/04/announcing-the-next-generation-of-microsofts-law-firm-diversity-program-working-
towards-a-more-diverse-and-inclusive-legal-profession/ [https://perma.cc/4HQQ-F6KF] 
(describing bonus structure of up to 2% of the legal fees billed to the company “based on 
their performance in increasing diversity in three aspects of a firm’s leadership. .	.	. (1) 
leading the management of the law firm; (2) leading the law firm’s relationship with 
Microsoft; and (3) leading work on Microsoft’s legal matters” (footnote omitted)). 
 291. See, e.g., Mary Flood, Shell Lawyer: There’s More to Diversity Than Lip Service, 
HOUS. CHRON. (May 13, 2007), https://www.chron.com/business/article/Shell-lawyer-There-s-
more-to-diversity-than-lip-1800430.php [https://perma.cc/2X8D-2EFX (staff-uploaded archive)] 
(describing the push by Shell’s general counsel to “insist[] on diversity and inclusiveness in 
her workplace and the places she hired,” such as requiring Shell’s law firms “to account .	.	. 
for how many female and minority lawyers work on Shell business, for how many hours 
they work and what they do”). 
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corporations to similarly “demand[] that the firms representing them 
field a diverse team of lawyers.”292 The preference is usually justified 
as being connected to both work performance and societal 
improvement.293 But can employers comply with such demands and 
explicitly take sex and race into account when staffing matters 
without running afoul of Title VII? In other words, can diversity 
become another preferred preference that successfully provides a 
defense to an employment discrimination claim? 
It is important to note both the overlap—and the key 
distinction—between the diversity preference and some of the 
physical privacy and psychological comfort cases discussed above, 
such as Wade, Little Forest, and Southwood. There, the employers 
sought to have diverse workforces (i.e., a male/female mix) present at 
all times so that they could satisfy their individual customers’ 
preferences. But in those cases, the employers were responding to 
their customers’ preferences for same-sex service or care. The 
ultimate effect was a diverse workforce, because the employers 
needed male employees for the male customers and female 
employees for the female customers. But that was not because any 
individual customer actually sought diversity—quite the contrary. 
Here, by contrast, the customer itself is requesting to be served by a 
diverse team of employees. 
As an initial matter, sometimes Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
provisions may not even be violated by creating employee teams that 
respond to customers’ diversity preferences. It is true that Title VII 
makes it unlawful both (1) to “discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin”294 and (2) to “limit, segregate, or classify his 
 
 292. Shira A. Scheindlin, Opinion, Female Lawyers Can Talk, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
8, 2017, at A23. Most recently, prodded by client Shonda Rhimes, Hollywood agency ICM 
Partners “pledged to reach 50-50 gender parity by the year 2020,” meaning that “in two 
years’ time, women will represent half the agency’s partnership, half its department heads 
and half its board of directors.” Rebecca Sun, ICM Partners Pledges to Reach 50-50 
Gender Parity by 2020 (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:30 A.M.), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/icm-partners-pledges-reach-50-50-gender-parity-
by-2020-1064634 [https://perma.cc/PC6W-E4DY]. 
 293. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 287 (quoting Facebook’s General Counsel who stated 
that “[f]irms typically do what their clients want .	.	.	. And we want to see them win our 
cases and create opportunities for women and people of color”); Letter from Kim M. 
Rivera, supra note 288 (“Our vision at HP is to create technology that makes the world a 
better place for everyone, everywhere. To achieve that vision, business leaders must 
represent the diversity of our customers and stakeholders.”). 
 294. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).  
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employees .	.	. in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”295 Both of these provisions are 
broadly implicated when an employer takes any of these protected 
characteristics into account when staffing matters. But limiting 
constructions apply to each of them.  
Under the first provision, it must be shown that an employer 
took a materially adverse employment action against the employee, 
rather than something that was de minimis or only temporary in 
effect.296 In particular, courts have held that lateral transfers—which 
seem roughly analogous to the re-staffing of particular client 
matters—are not necessarily adverse employment actions under Title 
VII, unless they result in a loss of prestige or diminished options for 
advancement.297 
Similarly, as to the second provision, the Seventh Circuit recently 
held that it is not enough to show that the employer took an action to 
classify employees based on race (or another protected 
characteristic). The plaintiff must also show that the classification 
either deprived, or at least had the tendency to deprive, a person of 
employment opportunities.298  
Thus, if an employer creates diverse work teams in a way that 
ensures that all employees are receiving equal employment 
opportunities, there may not be a Title VII issue at all. That is 
because it will be difficult for the plaintiff-employee to prove either a 
materially adverse employment action (under the first provision) or 
the tendency for a deprivation of employment opportunities (under 
the second provision). The more diverse an employer’s workforce is, 
the more easily it will be able to accomplish this, since the various 
client teams will likely each be diverse without active intervention or 
manipulation. 
 
 295. Id. §	2000e-2(a)(2).  
 296. See, e.g., McMillian v. Potter, 130 F. App’x 793, 796–97 (6th Cir. 2005); Bowman v. 
Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 297. See, e.g., Stewart v. Union Cty. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. App’x 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. 
Schs., 709 F. Supp. 2d 628, 647 (S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 298. See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 860 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the 
EEOC’s argument that “any action to limit, segregate, or classify employees because of 
race automatically violates” this section, and reasoning that “[i]f it’s not necessary to show 
that the challenged employment action ‘deprive[d] or tend[ed] to deprive’ the employee of 
employment opportunities ‘or otherwise adversely affect[ed] his status as an employee,’ 
what is the point of this statutory language?”) (alterations in original)), reh’g denied, 875 
F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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In other situations, though, an employee may be able to show at 
least the tendency for a deprivation and/or the potential for a 
materially adverse result. After all, some of the most high-profile 
companies are the ones currently expressing this preference—and 
their matters could arguably present the most career-enhancing 
opportunities.299 If an employer’s demographic makeup largely 
consists of nondiverse employees, then its diverse employees would 
likely get a disproportionate opportunity to work on those desirable 
matters in order to satisfy those clients’ diversity requirements. Thus, 
at some point courts may well have to decide whether the diversity 
preference can create a valid defense. 
So far, there is little precedent here that is directly on point. As 
Deborah Rhode has noted (in the specific context of analyzing how 
law firms should work toward diversity), “[w]hat further complicates 
the legal landscape is the uncertain status of preferential treatment 
that disfavors white men. .	.	. Client pressures typically are not a 
justification for such preferential treatment.”300 Similarly, Patrick 
Shin, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati write:  
Is there a tension between firms expressing an interest in 
pursuing diversity, on the one hand, and the space they have to 
do so, on the other, under current antidiscrimination law? 
Arguably, there is. .	.	. There is little doubt that at some point in 
the near future, the Supreme Court will weigh in on this 
question.301 
For sex-based decisions in staffing matters, there are two 
potential openings through which the diversity preference could 
plausibly enter: the BFOQ opening and the equal burdens opening. 
The latter seems more promising. As discussed above, the sex-based 
customer preferences that have successfully entered the BFOQ 
opening implicate privacy, particularly physical privacy. The physical 
privacy concern is clearly not applicable in situations involving the 
above types of requests by corporations for diverse teams. Moreover, 
employers would not be able to argue that female sex is a BFOQ for 
doing the actual work for a particular client, but would instead have 
 
 299. See supra notes 287–93 and accompanying text. 
 300. Rhode, supra note 286, at 1068 (footnote omitted). 
 301. Patrick Shin, Devon Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Diversity Feedback Loop, 2014 
U. CHI. L.F. 345, 345–46 (2014). Kingsley Browne also supports this proposition by stating, 
“[g]iven the widespread emphasis on diversity and the apparently common use of racial 
preferences to achieve it, there is surprisingly little case law under Title VII addressing the 
use of preferences outside the remedial context.” Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII and 
Diversity, 14 NEV. L.J. 806, 807 (2014). 
97 N.C. L. REV. 91 (2018) 
148 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
to argue that having a female member of the larger team is necessary. 
This, too, makes the BFOQ defense an awkward fit here. Under 
existing precedent, it would be difficult for a law firm to argue that 
female sex is a BFOQ, say, for being a member of the team working 
on Facebook’s matters but not Twitter’s, simply on the grounds that 
Facebook has a diversity requirement while Twitter does not.302 
There is, however, some potential for the equal burdens opening 
if courts are willing to expand it beyond its usual context of sex-
differentiated appearance policies. Like the employers in Craft and 
Jespersen, a defendant-employer could argue that satisfying these 
client preferences does not impose a greater burden on males than 
females. After all, men and women can still be staffed on any 
particular matter in equal numbers. Indeed, so far, all of these 
quantitative requirements still leave room for men to hold the 
majority of positions, making it even harder for men to argue that 
they are being unequally burdened. Moreover, except for situations 
where a client team is reshuffled midstream in response to a client’s 
diversity preference, it may be hard for any one employee to prove 
that he necessarily would have been staffed on the matter absent the 
diversity preference. Thus, the equal burdens opening could 
theoretically work here, in concert with the above-described 
requirement that the plaintiff-employee prove a materially adverse 
action or the tendency for a deprivation of opportunities in the first 
place. It is not clear, however, that courts would be willing to apply 
this opening to sex-differentiated treatment that goes beyond 
differential appearance policies. As discussed above, courts tend to be 
much more deferential to sex-differentiation that relates to bodies as 
opposed to division of labor.303 
For race/ethnicity-based staffing decisions, the openings largely 
disappear. The BFOQ defense does not apply to race or color, and 
there is no equal burdens doctrine for race/ethnicity-differentiated 
 
 302. See, e.g., id. at 822 (“[T]he BFOQ cases strongly suggest that an employer’s desire 
for diversity would not be a sufficient justification for preferences even if limited only to 
those classes for which the BFOQ defense is potentially available under Title VII (sex, 
religion, and national origin).”). But see Ernest F. Lidge III, Law Firm Employment 
Discrimination in Case Assignments at the Client’s Insistence: A Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 159, 176 (2005) (arguing that the BFOQ defense should 
allow law firms to satisfy individualized client requests for attorneys of a particular sex, 
given the intimacy of the attorney-client relationship); Deborah C. Malamud, The Strange 
Persistence of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 21 (2015) 
(suggesting, without further discussion, that “[t]o a limited extent, employers can use [the 
BFOQ defense] to justify diversity-based hiring” for sex, but not “race or color”). 
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 249–50. 
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policies. The business necessity defense to disparate impact claims is 
also inapplicable, because that only applies to facially neutral policies 
as opposed to policies that explicitly take protected characteristics 
into account. 
The one remaining avenue comes from a source outside the 
realm of customer preference openings: affirmative action doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has indeed indicated that Title VII leaves some 
room for employers to engage in voluntary affirmative action 
programs “designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in 
traditionally segregated job categories.”304 However, diversity 
rationales for affirmative action have not been explicitly endorsed 
outside the educational setting. Moreover, to the extent that such 
staffing approaches are used only for specific clients and tailored to 
those clients’ particular numerical requests, the affirmative action 
defense—which presumes a generally applicable policy—is a 
particularly awkward fit.305 Additionally, running throughout the 
affirmative action case law is disapproval of quotas or other 
quantitative requirements—the very type of numerical preference 
that clients are now expressing. 
Moving beyond the doctrinal challenges, the factors that this 
Article has used to unpack when and why courts are deferential to 
customer preferences also indicate some roadblocks. First, although 
the diversity preference does not seem invidiously discriminatory—
quite the contrary—it is not the same type of longstanding, ingrained 
social convention implicated by the other preferred preferences. 
Indeed, clients seem to be demanding diverse teams precisely because 
employers are not always providing them on their own. Indeed, rather 
than reaffirming the default norm, these overt diversity policies seem 
 
 304. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). 
 305. See Browne, supra note 301, at 807–08 (arguing that current affirmative action 
doctrine would not justify such policies); Corey A. Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The 
Frontier of Affirmative Action: Employment Preferences & Diversity in the Private 
Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 283, 347 (2010) (predicting that the Supreme Court would 
“strike down a voluntary, forward-looking, diversity-based workplace affirmative action 
plan”); Malamud, supra note 302, at 23 (viewing it as unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
see Grutter’s affirmative action doctrine “as creating a safe haven for corporate diversity 
practice”); Rhode, supra note 286, at 1068–69 (“Although the Supreme Court has 
narrowly upheld considerations based on diversity in educational admission programs so 
long as they do not involve fixed quotas, it is by no means clear how far this rationale 
would extend to employment contexts.”); Shin et al., supra note 301, at 345–46 (“[I]t is 
uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious hiring measures that seek to reap the 
workplace benefits of racial diversity, especially if such measures do not fit the mold of 
traditional affirmative action plans designed to remedy ‘manifest imbalances’ associated 
with past discrimination.”); Putnam, supra note 286, at 675. 
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to be trying to change the default. This differentiates the diversity 
preference from all of the other preferred preferences discussed 
above. That said, courts may be impressed that this is the one 
preference whose very goal is to promote equal employment 
opportunity, rather than being neutral (or worse) on the subject. 
Second, it is difficult to view the diversity preference for diverse 
teams as an actual need—particularly because it is new and only a 
handful of clients are expressing it. On the other hand, judges may be 
sympathetic to the diversity preference and find it reasonable. Indeed, 
some judges have recently been taking their own steps to increase 
diversity among the lawyers who have speaking roles in the 
courtroom, although they have not gone as far as imposing specific 
quantitative requirements.306 
Finally, there may be real judicial concern about the burden that 
employers’ satisfaction of these customer preferences could impose 
on nondiverse employees. Recall that in many of the above-described 
situations, employees at least had the theoretical option to comply 
with the preference—whether by wearing makeup, removing 
dreadlocks, exclusively speaking English at work, refraining from 
proselytization, or the like. Here, the disfavored employee has no 
option. In that way, the situation is more like the same-sex privacy 
preferences, where we saw that unless customer nudity was present, 
 
 306. Beyond retired Judge Scheindlin’s op-ed, at least two federal judges have recently 
amended their own courtroom rules to give junior attorneys more opportunities and 
incentives to speak in court in the hope of advancing the professional development of 
female and ethnically diverse attorneys. See Alan Feuer, A Federal Judge’s New Rule: Let 
More Women Argue Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2017, at A16 (discussing Eastern District 
of New York Judge Jack Weinstein’s new courtroom rules, which he implemented after 
speaking with Judge Scheindlin and learning more about the underrepresentation of 
female attorneys and ethnically diverse attorneys in the courtroom); see also HON. ANN 
DONNELLY, INDIVIDUAL PRACTICES AND RULES 3, https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/
AMD-MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4AK-L328] 
(“The participation of relatively inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings—
including but not limited to pre-motion conferences, pre-trial conference, hearings on 
discovery motions and dispositive motions, and examination of witnesses at trial—is 
strongly encouraged.”); HON. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL MOTION PRACTICE OF 
JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN, https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JBW-MLR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SQB3-KLEK] (“Junior members of legal teams representing clients are 
invited to argue motions they have helped prepare and to question witnesses with whom 
they have worked. .	.	. This court is amenable to permitting a number of lawyers to argue 
for one party if this creates an opportunity for a junior lawyer to participate.”); Kathryn 
Rubino, Hero Federal Judge Takes Steps to Increase Meaningful Experience for Diverse 
Lawyers, ABOVE THE L. (Aug. 24, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/
hero-federal-judge-takes-steps-to-increase-meaningful-experience-for-diverse-lawyers/?rf=1 
[https://perma.cc/4PGP-5QMB] (noting that, in addition to Judge Weinstein, Eastern 
District of New York Judge Ann M. Donnelly has taken a similar approach). 
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courts were largely unwilling to overlook the burden imposed on the 
disfavored sex. 
In sum, an expanded version of the equal burdens opening could 
theoretically work for the diversity preference. Courts may be willing 
to expand the equal burdens doctrine beyond the context of sex-
differentiated appearance standards—most likely for sex-based 
staffing decisions, and perhaps even to ethnicity-based staffing 
decisions too. But this would require a significant expansion, leading 
me to predict that diversity is likely to become—at most—a weakly 
preferred preference. In the next part, I suggest a new way of thinking 
about customer preferences, one that—among other things—points 
toward a better, and more legally defensible, way for employers to 
satisfy individual clients’ diversity preferences. 
III.  RETHINKING PREFERENCE DEFERENCE 
Looking at the preferred preferences collectively is illuminating. 
It makes clear that the doctrinal opening through which the customer 
preference enters is less important than the substance of the 
preference itself. The aesthetic appeal preference, for instance, gets 
roughly the same treatment whether it appears in the equal burdens 
opening, the job-related and consistent with business necessity 
opening, or the undue hardship opening. Moreover, legal principles 
migrate across the customer preference openings. Courts sometimes 
invoke BFOQ language when analyzing disparate impact and failure-
to-accommodate claims,307 and they sometimes employ reasonable 
accommodation language when coming up with disparate impact 
remedies.308 
It is not surprising that, despite the customer preference 
openings’ different formulations, they end up functioning similarly. 
The openings all sit at the tension between two different models of 
antidiscrimination law, persuasively described by Robert Post as the 
“dominant conception” and the “sociological account.”309 The 
“dominant conception” suggests that the purpose of 
antidiscrimination law is to remove all consideration of forbidden 
 
 307. See, e.g., Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(justifying ruling against bearded religious employee on grounds that “[s]ome courts have 
found that clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification in certain 
businesses” (citing EEOC v. Sambo’s of Ga., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981); and then 
citing In re E. Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 
1970))), aff’d, 31 F’ App’x 740 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 308. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 309. Post, supra note 198, at 31. 
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characteristics like race or sex—to “require[] employers to regard 
their employees as though they did not display socially powerful and 
salient attributes, because these attributes may induce irrational and 
prejudiced judgments.”310 By contrast, the “sociological account” does 
not expect or require such blindness, which Post views as 
unrealistic.311 Post further explains: 
The dominant conception of American antidiscrimination 
law aspires to suppress categories of social judgment that are 
deemed likely to be infected with prejudice. .	.	. There is thus a 
strong impulse within the dominant perspective to imagine the 
law as standing in a neutral space outside of history and of the 
contingent social practices of which history is comprised. .	.	. 
Because the dominant conception offers an implausible 
story about the actual shape of antidiscrimination law, I have 
proposed an alternative perspective, which we may call the 
sociological account, in which antidiscrimination law is 
understood as a social practice that acts on other social 
practices. .	.	. 
In contrast to the dominant conception, the sociological 
account accepts the inevitability of social practices. But 
precisely because of this acceptance, the account requires that 
principles be articulated that will guide and direct the 
transformation of social practices. Because the dominant 
conception seeks entirely to transcend and eliminate social 
practices, it has not fully developed such principles.312 
The customer preference openings provide important support for 
Post’s view that the sociological account better captures how 
antidiscrimination law actually works. After all, under the dominant 
conception, customer preferences should generally not be able to 
enter these openings at all. Moreover, each of the openings provides a 
mechanism through which the sociological approach can operate by 
facilitating a discussion about which preferences deserve to enter the 
openings and which should be ignored. 
Because of courts’ loyalty to the dominant conception, however, 
they struggle with how to use these openings. They state that 
 
 310. Id. at 11–12, 30. 
 311. See id. at 17, 31 (“Law is made by the very persons who participate in the social 
practices that constitute race, gender, and beauty. It would be astonishing, therefore, if 
American antidiscrimination law could transcend these categories, if it could operate in a 
way that rendered them truly irrelevant.”). 
 312. Id. at 30–31. 
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customer preferences are irrelevant while simultaneously deferring to 
some; and they frequently deny that the preferences are burdensome 
even when they are. Essentially, courts are trying to reconcile the 
cognitive dissonance between the theory that customer preferences 
should be irrelevant within antidiscrimination law and the reality that 
they still play a role (and indeed, that antidiscrimination law’s 
structure itself provides opportunities for them to do so). 
That blurred reasoning, in turn, has consequences for 
development of the law and for judicial legitimacy itself. For example, 
as Post observes: 
[A]n approach that accepted the insights of the sociological 
account would have invited the court in Craft explicitly to state 
and defend the grounds for its conclusions, and this in turn 
would have facilitated public review and critique. Such an 
approach would thus render decisions such as Craft far more 
accountable for their actual judgments.313  
But instead of doing that, the Craft court oversimplified and distorted 
the case, suggesting that it was just about the television station’s equal 
expectations of male and female newscasters to present a professional 
appearance.314 Similarly, the Jespersen court recast the casino’s 
explicitly sex-differentiated appearance policy as “for the most part 
unisex,” even though its requirement that female employees wear full 
makeup was the very focus of the claim.315 
So, what should courts do instead? First, they should be more 
explicit about their reasoning. Moreover, they should recognize that 
the considerations that are intuitively shaping their decisions—such as 
the strength of customer sentiment, and how burdensome it is on 
employees—are not as objective as they might seem. Rather, these 
considerations are inevitably viewed through the lens of judges’ own 
life experiences. Preferences that accord with majority practice, and 
with judges’ own conceptions of what seems reasonable, are most 
likely to strike judges as weighty and/or nonburdensome (because 
complying with them is the “reasonable,” “professional” thing to do). 
 
 313. Id. at 32. 
 314. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 315. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (“[Harrah’s] policy does not single out Jespersen. It applies to all of the bartenders, 
male and female. It requires all of the bartenders to wear exactly the same uniforms while 
interacting with the public in the context of the entertainment industry. It is for the most 
part unisex, from the black tie to the non-skid shoes. .	.	. The only evidence in the record to 
support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen’s own subjective reaction to the makeup 
requirement.”). 
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The cases involving the aesthetic appeal and English-only preferences 
especially illustrate this phenomenon, with women and 
ethnic/religious minorities often faring poorly.316 And of course, 
because these factors are not explicitly articulated by courts in the 
first place but are just lurking in the background, it is even easier for 
inconsistencies and biases to creep in. 
A better approach is to acknowledge that these customer 
preference openings exist, that none of them are limited to actual 
necessity, and that there is going to be some inevitable line drawing 
about which preferences get to enter and which do not. To aid that 
line drawing, this Article proposes two key guideposts: (1) a context-
specific look at whether the preference relates to the employee’s 
actual performance of the specific job and (2) a broad look at the 
extent to which the preference limits equal employment opportunity 
in the workplace. These guideposts are at least somewhat more 
objective than the factors described above. More importantly, they 
better reflect what antidiscrimination law is trying to achieve. 
A. Actual Performance of the Job 
The first guidepost that this Article proposes—whether the 
preference relates to the employee’s actual performance of the 
specific job—may sound familiar. It echoes the essence of the 
business standard that courts have articulated for the BFOQ 
defense.317 To be sure, “essence of the business” is not a self-defining 
term, nor is this Article’s proposed standard. As Yuracko has written, 
a business’s essence can be defined by employers, by customers, by 
some sort of inherent meaning, or by some sort of shared meaning.318 
Similarly, “actual job performance” can be defined expansively (by, 
for instance, encompassing even how the employee looks while 
performing the job) or narrowly (by focusing only on the 
performance of the substantive job responsibilities). I strongly 
advocate a narrow interpretation of this guidepost. Courts should 
 
 316. See Rich, supra note 270, at 1194 (arguing that modern Title VII cases are 
characterized by “discrimination by proxy,” in which an ostensibly neutral policy 
specifically names and prohibits cultural practices associated with particular racial/ethnic 
minorities); see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently 
White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (describing the 
phenomenon of “[t]ransparently white decisionmaking,” which “consists of the 
unconscious use of criteria of decision that are more strongly associated with whites than 
with nonwhites”). Flagg argues that “the imposition of transparently white norms amounts 
to a requirement that nonwhite employees assimilate to whites’ cultural expectations.” Id. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
 318. Yuracko, supra note 7, at 160–66. 
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limit it to the employee’s performance of specific tasks for the 
customer. 
Of the six preferred preferences, four typically implicate such 
performance: the preference for physical privacy from the opposite 
sex; the preference for psychological comfort with the same sex; the 
preference not to receive proselytization or judgment; and the 
convenience preference. All of those preferences, in different ways, 
involve the core interaction/transaction between employee and 
customer. The physical privacy preference involves situations where 
the employee, in performing the job itself, is seeing or even touching 
the naked body of the customer/client. The non-proselytization 
preference involves the substance of the employee’s words to the 
customer/client, simultaneous to the employee’s performance of the 
job. Indeed, in the case of counselors and therapists, the 
proselytization is sometimes occurring as part of the job. Recall that 
in Knight, the employees were not asking to be exempted from 
counseling certain clients. Rather, they were arguing that Title VII 
protected their affirmative right to proselytize to all clients.319 
Convenience, too, is connected to the core task: it is about how 
quickly the task at hand gets done for the customer. 
The most complex one is the same-sex psychological comfort 
preference, since it is less measurable and bounded than the other 
three, in which courts can look to purely objective markers—
respectively, whether pure nudity is involved, whether the employee 
is vocally proselytizing or expressing negative judgment toward 
customers, and the length of time that the customer is being 
inconvenienced. Because certain therapeutic jobs do implicate 
gender-related psychological privacy interests, however, courts should 
be more open to this preference. A number of psychological studies 
indicate not only that clients, particularly women, often prefer 
therapists of the same sex,320 but also that same-sex matches can 
actually lead to better therapeutic outcomes.321 The research is 
 
 319. See Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001); see also 
supra Section I.C.2. 
 320. See supra note 252. 
 321. Loree A. Johnson & Benjamin E. Caldwell, Race, Gender, and Therapist 
Confidence: Effects on Satisfaction with the Therapeutic Relationship in MFT, 39 AM. J. 
FAM. THERAPY 307, 315 (2011) (finding that “when therapists and clients matched in 
terms of gender, clients reported significantly greater satisfaction with the therapeutic 
relationship”); Landes et al., supra note 252, at 337 (“[Female p]articipants reported lower 
anticipated comfort self-disclosing to a male therapist and lower anticipated comfort self-
disclosing when the hypothetical presenting problem they were considering for therapy 
was female sex-specific. These findings extend previous literature showing that women 
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certainly mixed on this, and other factors matter too.322 It does, 
however, suggest that courts are being too simplistic in dismissing this 
interest as necessarily less weighty than the physical privacy 
interest.323 Again, none of this is to suggest that the same-sex 
psychological comfort preference is a need. It is not. But there is no 
principled basis for courts to treat it so much more skeptically and as 
less “real” than the other preferred preferences. Indeed, in jobs that 
implicate both physical privacy and psychological comfort, such as 
OB-GYNs, customers/patients often emphasize the psychological 
reasons over the physical privacy ones for preferring a same-sex 
provider.324 
The diversity preference can also directly relate to the 
performance of actual job responsibilities. Much research is being 
done on the issue of how diversity affects group performance in the 
employment setting, and the results so far are varied. On the one 
 
prefer a female therapist.”); Wintersteen et al., supra note 252, at 405 (focusing on 
adolescents and finding that, “[f]rom a patient perspective, a gender match with the 
therapist facilitated alliance development, and gender-matched dyads were more likely to 
complete two thirds of treatment”). A related question, as noted above, is whether and 
how employment discrimination doctrine will respond to the growing evidence that having 
a doctor of the same race can lead to better medical outcomes for racial-minority patients. 
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 322. See, e.g., Adrian J. Blow, Tina M. Timm & Ronald Cox, The Role of the Therapist 
in Therapeutic Change: Does Therapist Gender Matter?, 20 J. FEMINIST FAM. THERAPY 
66, 78 (2008) (concluding that there are “mixed findings” on whether gender predicts 
outcomes in therapy, noting that “there do not appear to be big differences between male 
and female therapists, except in working with adolescents (where [male] therapist gender 
seems particularly pertinent for engaging adolescent boys in treatment and keeping them 
engaged)” (emphasis added)); Caron Zlotnick, Irene Elkin & M. Tracie Shea, Does the 
Gender of a Patient or the Gender of a Therapist Affect the Treatment of Patients with 
Major Depression?, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 655, 657–58 (1998) (finding 
that “among depressed patients, a male or female therapist, or same- versus opposite-
gender pairing, was not significantly related to level of depression at termination, to 
attrition rates, or to the patient’s perceptions of the therapist’s degree of empathy early in 
treatment and at termination,” but noting that the therapists in this study had been 
“carefully selected, received specific training, and attained a certified level of 
competence,” which may have left “limited opportunity for differences to emerge between 
male and female therapists in their attitude and behavior toward patients”). 
 323. Particularly ironic, in light of the Hi 40 Corp. court’s dismissal of female 
customers’ preferences for discussing their weight loss and body image with female 
counselors, is an article suggesting that therapists’ gender may be especially relevant for 
bulimic patients. See Natalia Zunino, Ellen Agoos & William N. Davis, The Impact of 
Therapist Gender on the Treatment of Bulimic Women, 10 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 
253, 255 (1991) (suggesting, albeit without an actual experiment, that a therapist’s female 
gender may be particularly important in working with bulimic patients because that work 
implicates body image problems, mother-daughter relationships, ambivalent feelings 
about gender identity, and the need for a role model). 
 324. See Waldman, supra note 234, at 379–80. 
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hand, workforce diversity can yield more creativity and expanded 
perspectives; on the other, it can bring friction, especially when it is 
not well managed.325 In addition to these general results, there is also 
interesting anecdotal and empirical evidence about the benefits of 
diversity in specific job contexts. For example, one recent analysis 
concluded that gender diversity might also help reduce excessive risk 
taking among financial institutions.326 Relatedly, numerous articles 
have documented the value of having diverse writers’ rooms in 
Hollywood, in terms of leading to more interesting, realistic, and 
original scripts.327 
By contrast, the aesthetic appeal preference and the English-
speaking environment preference typically do not implicate the actual 
exchange of goods or services for which customers came. They are 
largely tangential to actual job performance. Some customers 
certainly may prefer that employees adhere to common appearance 
conventions or speak English to one another whenever the customer 
can hear them. But those are atmospheric preferences that are 
separable from how the employee actually performs his or her job 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the customer. Indeed, these preferences often 
appear in retail positions where the employee/customer interaction is 
more limited and transactional in the first place. 
Additionally, it is unclear that customers even care about these 
atmospherics as much as employers think they do. Recall, for 
instance, the Sephora case, where the court deferred to Sephora’s 
 
 325. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and 
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21–22 (2005) 
(asserting that, while some evidence indicates that diverse workgroups generate a broader 
range of ideas early on in decision-making processes, diversity can also bring friction, 
decreased workplace satisfaction, and increased absenteeism and turnover); Rhode, supra 
note 286, at 1061–63. 
 326. Kristin N. Johnson, Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve 
Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight, 70 SMU L. REV. 327, 356–59 (2017); cf. Darren 
Rosenblum & Daria Roithmayr, More Than a Woman: Insights into Corporate 
Governance After the French Sex Quota, 48 IND. L. REV. 889, 890–92 (2015) (looking at 
the related question of whether adding women to a board affects decision making, and 
concluding that it may, primarily because they are more likely to be outsiders). 
 327. See Cara Buckley, Embracing Diversity, but Finding It Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 3, 2018, at A1 (“Having female or minority writers can have an enormous impact on 
what goes onscreen. Stereotypes can be challenged and questions asked .	.	. [a]nd when 
there is more than one woman or minority writer in the room, several writers said, they 
are more likely to be heeded, and less likely to be called on as the voice of all women or 
people of color.”); Bryn Elise Sandberg, TV Showrunners Talk Sexism in Writers Rooms, 
Hiring Diverse Staff and Weinstein’s Blacklist, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 9, 2018, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/tv-showrunners-talk-sexism-writers-rooms-
hiring-diverse-staff-weinsteins-blacklist-1118723 [https://perma.cc/ZBT5-Z5U6].  
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belief that customers would be turned off by hearing employees 
converse with each other in Spanish, without any actual evidence 
supporting that view.328 Courts should heighten their skepticism here. 
B. Effect on Equal Employment Opportunity 
In addition to considering whether the preference relates to 
actual job performance, courts should also consider—when deciding 
how much deference to accord—whether the preference, particularly 
in the aggregate, is likely to limit equal employment opportunity. 
Here, too, the aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment 
preferences raise the strongest concerns. Their burdens are not 
equally distributed but instead fall hardest on women and minority 
groups in ways that can prevent their equal thriving in the workplace. 
Consider, for instance, Darlene Jespersen’s exit from her long-held 
bartender position specifically because she was uncomfortable 
wearing full makeup every day;329 Chastity Jones’s decision to quit her 
job at Catastrophe Management Solutions rather than cut off her 
dreadlocks;330 or the Camara court’s suggestion that an employee 
should just transfer to a non-customer-contact position if she insisted 
on continuing to wear a hijab.331 Neither the various aesthetic appeal 
preferences nor the English-speaking environment preferences are 
randomly distributed among a variety of looks, religions, or dialects. 
Rather, they specifically reinforce majority default norms and burden 
those who differ from them. 
By contrast, the other four preferred preferences—along with 
the diversity preference—do not operate in such a one-sided way. 
Thus, they do not undermine equal employment opportunity to the 
same extent. The physical and psychological same-sex privacy 
preferences are symmetrical, with males preferring males and females 
preferring females.332 Thus, they do not necessarily favor either sex—
as opposed to, for instance, the early BFOQ cases in which airlines 
argued that everyone preferred a female flight attendant.333 The 
preference not to receive proselytization or judgment, while indeed 
burdening the small number of employees whose religion requires 
 
 328. See EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see 
also supra text accompanying note 263.  
 329. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 330. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1020–22 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g 
denied, 876 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 331. Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1327–28 (N.D. Ga. 2017).  
 332. See discussion supra Sections II.B–C. 
 333. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text. 
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them to vocally proselytize or judge others, also works to ensure that 
other customers and employees feel welcome in the workplace. 
Recall, for instance, the Peterson case, in which the plaintiff-employee 
posted anti-gay quotations that were visible to customers and 
colleagues.334 By ruling in favor of the employer that had refused to 
allow this,335 the court ensured that others would feel welcome in the 
workplace. In that way, although the preference does limit 
employment opportunities for some, it tends to ensure those 
opportunities for many more. And the convenience preference largely 
supports the privacy and nonproselytization/judgment preferences; it 
does not impose an additional burden of its own. 
Finally, the diversity preference—whose legal status is still 
uncertain336—is the one preference explicitly aimed at promoting 
equal employment opportunity in the workplace. That is certainly to 
its credit. Even so, employers should not respond to this preference 
merely by cobbling together teams on an ad hoc basis to meet 
particular clients’ quantitative diversity preferences. Such an 
approach is normatively undesirable for several reasons. Not only 
does it suggest that diversity only matters when important clients 
request it, but it can pit employees against each other for spots on 
these high-profile matters, leading to resentment and discord.337 And 
it is legally risky to respond to the preference in this way, given the 
prevailing doctrine. As explained above, the diversity preference does 
not fit neatly into any of the existing customer preference openings, 
and it is not at all clear that courts will defer to it. 
The best approach here is for employers to respond to the 
growing diversity preference through mechanisms that are truly 
geared toward promoting equal opportunity for all. This means not 
just satisfying the diversity preference for the specific clients who 
request it, but instead adopting broad workplace policies that are 
aimed at making sure that all employees receive good opportunities 
for professional development and can thrive in the workplace. Such 
policies include close attention to the staffing of all matters (not only 
in terms of the diversity of each client team but also in terms of 
 
 334. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 335. Id. at 608. 
 336. See supra Section II.G. 
 337. Cf. Buckley, supra note 327 (noting, in the context of television studios’ push for 
more diverse writing staffs, that “some female and minority writers question whether they 
are being courted because of a genuine push for diversity, or simply because male 
showrunners want cover from criticism” and quoting a supervising producer from “The 
Americans” as having “met white male writers who believe they were passed over because 
a minority or women got their slot,” an attitude she described as “poisonous”).  
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whether different employees are getting equivalent opportunities to 
work on high-profile matters), plus initiatives like broadly available 
part-time options and parental leave. 
Not only is this approach more normatively consistent with equal 
employment opportunity, but it is doctrinally safer. After all, the 
more that employers adopt these measures as part of an overall 
approach toward ensuring equal opportunity for each employee, the 
harder it will be for any particular employee to show that he or she 
was harmed by the way that the employer satisfied a specific client’s 
diversity preferences. This will make it less likely for a court to find 
that a materially adverse action and/or the deprivation of an 
employment opportunity has occurred at all. By the same token, such 
an approach makes the “equal burdens” doctrine—to the extent that 
courts are inclined to adapt it to this context—an easier fit. 
Additionally, adopting diverse staffing as part of a general policy 
(rather than only in response to customers’ specific numerical 
requests) betters the prospects for an affirmative action defense. 
Finally, to the extent that such policies help employers continue to 
diversify their employee pool, the more naturally employers can 
satisfy their clients’ diversity preferences in the future without active 
intervention. Thus, although these measures will require real time, 
thought, and effort by employers, they are the best way to respond to 
the growing diversity preference in the workplace. 
CONCLUSION 
The preferred preference hierarchy needs some reordering. The 
first step is acknowledging that it exists at all and recognizing how it 
works. This Article has sought to provide that contribution, showing 
that each individual preferred preference is not just a one-off 
exception to the supposed irrelevance of customer preferences but 
part of a collective body of doctrine that operates according to its own 
largely unarticulated principles. 
By teasing out those principles and proposing to supplant them 
with two more objective guideposts—whether the preference (1) 
relates to actual job performance and (2) will limit equal employment 
opportunity—this Article hopes to reshape the role of customer 
preferences within employment discrimination law. In particular, this 
Article argues that the English-only environment and aesthetic 
appeal preferences do not warrant their respective statuses as strongly 
preferred and moderately preferred. They are tangential to actual job 
performance and they limit equal employment opportunity. The 
presumption should be that these preferences do not deserve 
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deference, and they should only be weakly preferred, if at all. By 
contrast, the same-gender psychological comfort preference does not 
deserve its current position at the bottom of the hierarchy, given its 
relationship to the actual performance of certain jobs that implicate 
therapeutic concerns and its symmetrical treatment of both sexes. It 
should be moderately preferred rather than weakly preferred. 
Additionally, although the diversity preference is markedly different 
from the other preferences—given that it attempts to change, rather 
than reaffirm, default norms—it too should receive some deference, 
particularly when it is satisfied as part of an overall commitment to 
equal employment opportunity. 
In the end, the validity of a particular customer preference is 
always going to be context specific, and it should be. But by keeping 
the above guideposts in mind, courts can strike a better balance of 
incorporating customer preferences into antidiscrimination law while 
remaining true to its ultimate aims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
